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INTRODUCTION
We know the basic procedural requirements applicable to agencies. When an agency issues a regulation, it must go through noticeand-comment procedures.1 The final rule can then be subjected to judicial “hard look review.”2 When an agency formally adjudicates, it
must use trial-like procedures, including providing notice, a hearing,
and cross-examination of witnesses.3 The decision can then be challenged in court to ensure it was based on “substantial evidence.”4
These procedural requirements are well-worn, well-studied, and
mostly well-understood—albeit not fully developed or uncontested.
They form what we conventionally call “administrative law.”
But, what about the President? The President issues regulations,
adjudicates whether individuals have violated applicable law, and
does much more. Yet, unlike the highly reticulated and sophisticated
body of law that governs how agencies conduct these tasks, we lack
even a basic understanding of what procedural law, if any, binds the
1. For informal rules, the agency must first publish a proposed rule, accept public comments, and publish a final rule accompanied by a statement of “basis and purpose.” 5 U.S.C. § 553; see also Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015) (“An
agency must consider and respond to significant comments received during the period
for public comment.”).
2. “Hard look review” requires the agency to show, inter alia, it has considered
the relevant evidence and drew rational inferences from it. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle
Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S., Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (setting forth the standard test for arbitrary and capricious review in administrative law).
3. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 554, 556. Informal adjudications can be done with different
forms of hearing but also typically involve notice and a hearing. See, e.g., 1 CHARLES H.
KOCH, JR. & RICHARD MURPHY, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW & PRACTICE § 2:33 (3d ed. Supp. 2020)
(“Generally all informal adjudications have . . . notice, some opportunity to participate
and reasons.”).
4. See, e.g., Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229–30 (1938) (“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . . . Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.”).
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President. Unlike agency exercises of power, the President is not
bound by the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) or the robust judicially created procedural law that has grown out of that Act.5 So what
law governs?
The perhaps surprising answer is that we do not know. For whatever reason, this question has gone largely unexplored by scholars. To
the extent there is any conventional wisdom on this issue, it is that the
President has essentially no procedural obligations in how she exercises power.6 Indeed, we have now heard this from the top. President
Trump famously stated that “I have an Article II, where I have to the
right to do whatever I want as [P]resident.”7 Of course, this is not
true—there are substantive limits on the President’s power.8 But neither is it true that the President can exercise power however she
wants. There are procedural limits too. Although the President is not
bound by administrative law, there is a body of procedural law that
governs the President—call it presidential law.
As part of this body of law, this Article argues that the President
has a duty to deliberate. Before the President can exercise substantive
power delegated directly to her, the President must first satisfy a procedural hurdle: she must gather relevant information and make a considered judgment based on that information. If she does not do so, she
has acted unlawfully—she has failed to comply with her procedural
obligations in exercising power.
5. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 801 (1992) (“As the APA does not
expressly allow review of the President’s actions, we must presume that his actions
are not subject to its requirements.”). For a comprehensive argument challenging the
correctness of this Supreme Court decision, see Kathryn E. Kovacs, Constraining the
Statutory President, 98 WASH. U. L. REV. 63, 83–96 (2020).
6. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The Statutory President, 90 IOWA L. REV. 539, 552
(2005) [hereinafter Stack, The Statutory President] (“In contrast to legislation or
agency regulation, there are almost no legally enforceable procedural requirements
that the president must satisfy before issuing (or repealing) an executive order or
other presidential directive.”); WILLIAM G. HOWELL, POWER WITHOUT PERSUASION: THE
POLITICS OF DIRECT PRESIDENTIAL ACTION 17 (2003) (“Beyond the 1937 Federal Register
Act’s publication requirements, presidents need not abide by any fixed requirements
when developing, issuing, or circulating an executive order or proclamation.”).
7. Michael Brice Saddler, While Bemoaning Mueller Probe, Trump Falsely Says the
Constitution Gives Him ‘The Right To Do Whatever I Want,’ WASH. POST (July 23, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/07/23/trump-falsely-tells
-auditorium-full-teens-constitution-gives-him-right-do-whatever-i-want [https://
perma.cc/NCN3-PMHM].
8. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (holding presidential exercise of power invalid because it was not authorized by the Constitution or statute); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) (discussing limits to executive privilege).
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Identifying this duty is extremely important. Although there has
been a sense that statutory delegations specifically to the President
are limited to inconsequential powers, at least outside the area of foreign affairs,9 this is not the case. The President has a vast array of powers in both the foreign and domestic sphere. Consider a few examples:
• The President is tasked with determining “by regulation” the
“quantities of oil and any hazardous substances the discharge
of which may be harmful to the public health or welfare or
the environment of the United States,” as well as publishing a
highly consequential “national contingency plan” establishing the procedures for the federal response to oil and chemical spills, including methods to remove such hazardous materials, how to discover which facilities are releasing them,
and how to remedy such spills.10
• The President has frozen “prices, rents, wages, and salaries”
throughout the economy upon finding that doing so was
needed to “stabilize the economy, reduce inflation, and minimize unemployment.”11
• The President can impose regulations on government procurement contracts, which make up approximately ten percent of gross domestic product, so long as she determines
such regulations will promote “economy and efficiency in
government procurement.”12
• The President can close or take over telecommunications stations, upon declaring a “national emergency” and
“deem[ing]” such action “necessary in the interest of national
security or defense.”13
• The President can “restrict exports of energy supplies, require accelerated production of crude oil or national gas,” fill
9. See, e.g., Colin S. Diver, Presidential Powers, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 519, 523 (1987)
(“Direct congressional delegations of operational powers to the President are rather
insignificant, at least in domestic affairs.”); Peter L. Strauss, Presidential Rulemaking,
72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 965, 981–82 (1997) (suggesting delegations to the President are
limited to foreign affairs or other areas where the President has inherent constitutional authority).
10. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)–(4) (describing presidential authority for regulating oil and hazardous substance liability); 42 U.S.C. § 9605 (describing the national
contingency plan).
11. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727 (Aug. 17, 1971); see also Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, 84 Stat. 799, § 202.
12. Auth. To Issue Exec. Ord. on Gov’t Procurement, 19 Op. O.L.C. 90, 90 (1995);
see also 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a).
13. 47 U.S.C. § 606(c).
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or tap the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, implement energy
conservation contingency plans, prohibit burning of petroleum or other fuels, or increase fuel production if she concludes there is a “severe energy supply interruption.”14
• The President can create national monuments by publicly
proclaiming the existence of “historic landmarks . . . situated
on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government” and
reserving parcels “confined to the smallest area compatible
with the proper care and management of the objects to be
protected.”15
• The President can ban the entry of certain classes of aliens
from entering the United States so long as she determines
their entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the
United States,” and she can set the number of refugees permitted to enter the United States by “determin[ing]” the number “justified by humanitarian concerns or . . . otherwise in
the national interest.”16
These are extremely serious powers, all of which require predicate findings. The President cannot make all these findings and exercise these powers arbitrarily without any required procedures. Or so
I will argue.
In particular, the President has an existing positive duty to deliberate. This duty is not grounded solely in Founding-era conceptions of
what “faithful” execution requires—although such conceptions support it17—but is based primarily in the most common source of positive constitutional law today: Supreme Court precedent.18 Scholars
14. Legal Auths. Available to the President To Respond to a Severe Energy Supply
Interruption or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petrol. Prods., 6 Op. O.L.C.
644, 651, 685 (1982).
15. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)–(b).
16. 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(f), 1157(a).
17. See infra Part II.A.
18. As discussed infra in Part II.A, recent scholarship on the original public meaning of the faithful execution clauses has suggested that these clauses require the President to be “diligent,” “conscientious,” or use “reasonable care.” Andrew Kent, Ethan J.
Leib & Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Faithful Execution and Article II, 132 HARV. L. REV.
2111, 2179 (2019); Evan D. Bernick, Faithful Execution: Where Administrative Law
Meets the Constitution, 108 GEO. L.J. 1, 5 (2019). These conceptions certainly support
the duty discussed below. But even if one accepts that these terms bind the President—
and I have also suggested similar obligations can be derived from the Take Care
Clause’s text, see Shalev Roisman, Presidential Factfinding, 72 VAND. L. REV. 825, 855–
56 (2019)—it is hard to know what such requirements mean concretely for regulating
the President today without evaluating other sources of law. To help flesh out such
meaning, this Article focuses primarily on Supreme Court precedent and historical
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have yet to conduct a thorough examination of Supreme Court precedent to determine what procedures the Court believes the President
must abide by.19 Doing so turns out to be quite illuminating. A review
of a wide variety of Supreme Court case law evaluating presidential
exercises of power—ranging from cases on the nondelegation doctrine, to deference to presidential judgment, to the presumption of
regularity, to executive privilege, to the veto power, to the Court’s
most recent foray into this field in Trump v. Hawaii20—reveals that the
Court has long assumed that the President is under a duty to gather
relevant information and make a considered judgment based on it before exercising power.21 To be sure, the Court has not addressed the
President’s first-order procedural obligations explicitly22 or put the
branch practice. Looking beyond original public meaning might also speak to skeptics
of these originalist accounts. Non-originalists are unlikely to be convinced by these accounts and even those inclined to agree with originalism might not agree with the precise originalist methodology used. See, e.g., infra note 123. By focusing on Supreme
Court precedent and a history of internal executive branch advice the hope is to identify more concrete procedural requirements that bind the modern President based on
a more robust and perhaps less contestable source of law.
19. Existing scholarship has certainly touched on the procedural obligations of
the President, but this work has tended to focus on the proper mode of judicial review
for presidential orders. See, e.g., Lisa Manheim & Kathryn A. Watts, Reviewing Presidential Orders, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. 1743 (2019) (arguing for the need for a clear legal framework for judicial review of presidential orders); David M. Driesen, Judicial Review of
Executive Orders’ Rationality, 98 B.U. L. REV. 1013 (2018); Kevin M. Stack, The Reviewability of the President’s Statutory Powers, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1171 (2009) [hereinafter
Stack, Reviewability] (arguing that executive orders should be subject to ultra vires review); Stack, The Statutory President, supra note 6, at 570. Others have focused on the
original public meaning of the “faithful execution” clauses of the Constitution. See Kent
et al., supra note 18; Bernick, supra note 18. Another line of scholarship has examined
the President’s use of various procedures as a matter of practice rather than what is
required by positive law. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, Presidential Norms and Article II, 131
HARV. L. REV. 2187 (2018); JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE
PRESIDENCY AFTER 9/11 (2012). This scholarship is all extremely valuable, but it has not
focused on the President’s first-order procedural requirements as a matter of positive
law based primarily on existing Supreme Court precedent. As noted above, by focusing
on the President’s legal obligations as established by Supreme Court precedent, the
hope is to provide a more easily applicable and perhaps less contestable foundation
than relying solely on originalist methods. See infra Part II.A. And by focusing on the
President’s positive legal obligations, we might avoid protracted and difficult to reconcile normative debates over the optimal form of judicial review in the abstract by tying
the form of judicial review directly to the President’s existing positive legal obligations.
See generally Part III.A.
20. 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2400 (2018).
21. See infra Part II.B.
22. By first-order obligations, I mean obligations imposed on the President by Article II of the Constitution or by statute that attach regardless of whether those obligations are enforced by judicial review. See, e.g., Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking,
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duty quite in this way. But an examination of Supreme Court case law
on presidential power establishes that the Court has long assumed the
President must engage in deliberation before exercising power.23
Moreover, a review of internal executive branch legal opinions since
the Founding era reveals that the President’s top legal advisers have
also long assumed the President is bound by a duty to deliberate.24
With clarity about the president’s procedural duties, we can identify several concrete pathways for ensuring those obligations are enforced. First, once we understand the President’s positive duty to deliberate, determining how courts ought to review presidential
directives becomes rather straightforward. Courts can simply engage
in procedural review to ensure the President has gathered relevant
information and made a considered judgment informed by such evidence. Typically, this will require the President to explain that she has
consulted with experts within the executive branch and made a decision informed by such consultations or explain why she was justified
in not doing so. Looking to the President’s positive legal obligations
thus might help provide a starting point for recent debates over the
proper mode of judicial review of presidential orders, which have
been primarily normative in nature, by tying the form of judicial review directly to positive law.25
Second, and potentially most consequentially, the President herself can help ensure that this duty is complied with. Due to a wide variety of justiciability, standing, and deference doctrines, exercises of
presidential power will rarely result in judicial review.26 By far the
most impactful way to ensure the President abides by her procedural
obligations is for the President to impose procedural requirements on
herself. The President might well have the incentive to impose such
requirements going forward,27 and doing so could be relatively
55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 206 (1976) (“[C]onstitutional directives for what to do and what
not to do in making and administering law are addressed to government in the first
instance, and to judges only upon a claim that government has disregarded such a directive.”); id. at 244 (“It is not mere theory to distinguish between constitutional law
and judicial review.”); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, Internal Administrative Law,
115 MICH. L. REV. 1239, 1264 (2017); cf. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. at 2424 (Kennedy,
J., concurring) (“There are numerous instances in which the . . . actions of Government
officials are not subject to judicial scrutiny or intervention. That does not mean those
officials are free to disregard the Constitution . . . .”).
23. For responses to potential counterarguments to the existence of such a positive duty, see infra Part II.B.7.
24. See infra Part II.C.
25. See generally infra Part III.A.
26. See infra note 228 and accompanying text.
27. See infra Part III.B.
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simple. Presidents already procedurally regulate how written directives, such as executive orders and proclamations, are approved. To
ensure that the President is abiding by the duty to deliberate, the President could simply amend the existing order that governs how these
directives are issued and require that they go through an interagency
process of information gathering and review before they are promulgated, at least absent some emergency circumstance. Such interagency review is already common practice, but it is not required by
the formal order governing such directives, and it is not always conducted. Imposing such a formal requirement would thus likely improve compliance with the duty to deliberate.28
Identifying the duty to deliberate also helps illuminate a perplexing pattern of conduct during the Trump administration. President
Trump frequently issued seemingly off-the-cuff directives to subordinates only to have them ignored.29 With the duty to deliberate in mind,
we can see that these attempted exercises of power were, in fact, unlawful because the President had made the decision impulsively, arbitrarily, and without gathering relevant information and making a considered judgment based on it. Although these instances of
noncompliance may not have been consciously motivated by this realization, identifying the duty can help justify them. More importantly,
it points toward a way to prevent them in the future: The President
could formally require that future presidential directives should not
be obeyed if they are not preceded by due deliberation.
Finally, Congress could help ensure the President abides by her
duty by passing a framework statute requiring such deliberation before the President exercises power delegated to her by statute. Such a
requirement would be presumptively constitutional but could be unconstitutional in particular instances if it failed standard separation of
powers balancing.30
28. See infra Part III.B.
29. See infra Part III.B (listing examples). For example, subordinates ignored the
President’s initial order requiring a transgender military ban, his directive to reinstate
certain honors to a pardoned Navy SEAL, to evacuate troops from South Korea, as well
as his initial order to fire the ambassador to Ukraine. See infra note 241. More broadly,
former Secretary of Defense James Mattis reportedly repeatedly “simply ignored the
president’s directives, considering them insufficiently thought through.” Dexter Filkins, Trump’s Public-Relations Army, NEW YORKER (June 6, 2020), https://www
.newyorker.com/news/daily-comment/trumps-public-relations-army [https://
perma.cc/946K-MWZN].
30. See generally infra Part III.C. In particular, it would be unconstitutional in instances where it “prevent[ed] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” and such impact was not “justified by an overriding need
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Identifying the duty to deliberate thus reveals what the President’s baseline procedural obligations are and how best to enforce
them. But a glaring normative question remains: is it normatively sufficient for the President to exercise such a vast array of powers in both
the foreign and domestic realm simply by consulting internal executive branch actors and making a considered judgment? We certainly
would not think it legitimate for agencies to issue rules or adjudicate
disputes after only consulting and considering such actions internally.
So, how do we evaluate the legitimacy of the President’s exercising
analogous power with these relatively minimal procedural obligations?
The existing literature on the topic tells us fairly little about this
question. Although there has been an enormous body of scholarship
on “presidential administration,” that scholarship has focused on the
President’s role in influencing agency action.31 It has conceived of the
President as playing a legitimating role on top of agency procedures,
not in lieu of them. This scholarship has not focused on what procedural obligations might be needed to legitimate the President’s exercise of power delegated directly to her. But a close look at this literature reveals that even defenders of the President’s legitimating role in
influencing agency conduct are uncomfortable with the idea of the
President exercising analogous power on her own without abiding by
anything close to the procedural strictures required of agencies. In
short, if we take the existing literature on the legitimacy of the administrative state seriously, it raises real questions about the normative
sufficiency of the existing procedural obligations on the President. But
to understand how and when we ought to bolster these procedural
requirements, we will need more information about when precisely
the President is delegated power, how Congress currently procedurally regulates such delegations, and a better understanding of why
Congress delegates power to the President, rather than agency heads,
in the first place. While such a project necessarily lies beyond the
scope of this Article, the hope is to lay the groundwork for such exploration.

to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.” Nixon v. Adm’r
of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977).
31. See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245
(2001); Peter L. Strauss, Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative
Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696 (2007); David J. Barron, From Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1095 (2008); Kathryn A. Watts, Controlling Presidential Control, 114 MICH. L. REV. 683
(2016).
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Before moving to the body of the Article, it is worth putting the
import of identifying the President’s procedural duties into relief. If
the President truly has no procedural obligations in exercising power,
then the President could issue environmental regulations, ration energy consumption, seize private property, classify information, use
military force abroad, or call out the militia at home all based on a
whim—without gathering any relevant information, without considering such information, without thinking through the effects of acting,
indeed without thinking anything through at all.32 When put this way,
the notion that the President can exercise all these powers arbitrarily—that she has no procedural obligations—seems hard to square
with an office of the presidency limited by law that our Constitution
contemplates.33 This Article seeks to make headway in identifying
whether such procedural obligations in fact exist, where they come
from, what they might entail, how they might be enforced, and how
they might be improved.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides a survey of the
breadth of substantive powers delegated to the President by name by
the Constitution, as well as by statute. Having laid out the breadth of
32. For another extremely valuable and contemporaneous critique of this notion,
see Matthew Steilen, Presidential Whim, 46 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 489 (2020).
33. The Constitution limits the President’s power to that which is delegated to
her—either by the Constitution or by statute. All the powers mentioned here whether
delegated by the Constitution or by Congress are conditioned on the President making
certain factual or policy findings. See infra notes 34–38 and accompanying text. If the
President can make all these findings arbitrarily—without going through any procedures at all—it is hard to say that she is exercising the powers delegated to her, rather
than exercising whatever power she feels like. See, e.g., LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL
OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 595 (1965) (“The ‘law’ does not operate in a vacuum. The
application of law requires a factual predicate; an action without such a predicate is
lawless. A finding of fact which is based on no more than the will or desire of the administrator is lawless in substance if not in form.”); Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S.
388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“Either the statute means that the President
is to adhere to the declared policy of Congress, or it means that he is to exercise a
merely arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates the act; the other saps its life.
A choice between them is not hard.”); id. at 448 (“If legislative power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional government that the condition
be fulfilled. In default of such fulfillment, there is in truth no delegation, and hence no
official action, but only the vain show of it.”). Of course, even if such procedural obligations exist, this does not mean compliance with such obligations is judicially reviewable. Even so, it remains important to clarify what first-order obligations bind the President for a number of reasons, including enabling better public accountability,
congressional oversight, the identification of appropriate internal executive branch
constraints, and the proper form of judicial review. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at
853–54 (explaining why identifying first-order obligations is important even if the obligations are not judicially enforced).
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the President’s power, Part II asks what procedural obligations apply
to the President when she exercises such power. It first shows how
the constitutional text supports a duty to deliberate but focuses primarily on how Supreme Court case law supports the existence of such
a duty. It then shows how internal executive branch actors have also
long assumed such a duty applies to the President. It concludes by discussing the scope of the duty and what it entails. Part III then asks how
such a duty might be enforced by courts, by the President, and by Congress. Finally, Part IV examines the normative sufficiency of the duty
to deliberate, given the vast array of powers delegated to the President. A brief conclusion follows.
I. THE BREADTH OF PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION
Before delving into the procedural law that binds the President,
it is worth addressing the stakes of identifying such procedural requirements. They are enormous. As this Part shows, the President is
delegated a vast array of power in all areas of life, foreign and domestic. The question of what procedural law binds the President is thus
the question of whether the President can exercise powers relating to
freezing prices in the economy, cleaning up oil and chemical spills,
calling out the militia or sending military forces abroad all on a whim,
or whether the President must go through some procedures before
doing so. This Part first, very briefly, surveys the substantive constitutional powers delegated to the President before providing a more indepth survey of the statutory field of presidential delegation.
Before beginning the survey of powers, it is worth clarifying that
all the powers discussed below are conditional. This means that before
exercising any of these powers, the President must first make a certain
finding that a condition—either of fact or policy judgment—has been
or will be met. In earlier work, I have explained that constitutional or
statutory delegations to the President can be divided into three categories: (1) Pure Fact Powers; (2) Mixed Fact and Policy Powers; and
(3) Pure Discretion Powers.34 Pure Fact powers require the President
to make a finding of fact before exercising power; Mixed Fact and Policy Powers require the President to find relevant facts and, based on
those facts, determine if the exercise of power meets the judgmental
policy criteria the Constitution or Congress has set forth; and Pure Discretion powers allow the President to act before making any particular factual finding or policy judgment.35 These three categories are not
34. See Roisman, supra note 18, at 845–52.
35. See id. at 846–47.
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hermetically sealed but rather operate on a spectrum.36 So while linedrawing problems remain, the point to see is that for powers in categories (1) or (2)—Pure Fact or Mixed Fact and Policy Powers—before
the President can exercise power she must first find that a certain fact
in the world exists or that certain conduct would fulfill some policy
interest, for example, that it is necessary to protect the “national defense” or that it is in the “paramount interest of the United States.”37
All the powers discussed below fall into categories (1) or (2)—they
require the President either to find particular facts or make a particular policy judgment before exercising power—and the duty discussed
in Part II applies to such exercises of power.38
A. CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS
As is well known, the Constitution delegates a wide array of powers directly to the President. For example, the President has the power
to use military force in certain circumstances, such as to prevent an
attack on the United States, protect American lives abroad, or perhaps
even to preserve regional stability or prevent humanitarian catastrophes.39 The President can settle American citizens’ claims against foreign states if she determines such settlement is “a necessary incident
to the resolution of a major foreign policy dispute between our country and another.”40 She can recognize foreign governments upon finding that the relevant “‘entity possesses the qualifications for statehood,’ including a defined territory, permanent population,
government control, and capacity to engage in international

36. Id. at 846.
37. Id. at 845–52.
38. The duty identified below may well also apply to purely discretionary powers,
to the extent they exist. Id. at 851 n.117 (expressing skepticism that many or any delegations are truly purely discretionary). But, given how few of those there are, I found
it easier to focus on conditional powers.
39. The breadth of this power is highly contested. See, e.g., CURTIS A. BRADLEY &
JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW 658–60 (6th ed. 2017) (“There is general
agreement that . . . the President has the power to repel attacks on the United States . . .
[and] to use force to protect the lives and property of U.S. citizens abroad.”); id. at 664
(questioning whether “prevent[ing] a humanitarian catastrophe” or “preserving regional stability” and “supporting the U.N. Security Council’s credibility and effectiveness” are the types of “national interests” that warrant unilateral presidential uses of
force); see also Roisman, supra note 18, at 835 n.31 (collecting sources on the debate).
40. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981).
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relations.”41 She has the power to appoint officers42 and remove lands
from public sale if doing so is in the “public interest.”43 She can convene a special session of Congress if she determines there is an “extraordinary Occasion[],”44 withhold information from Congress based
on executive privilege if, “in [the President’s] considered view, [releasing it] would be sufficiently detrimental to the public interest,”45 and
perhaps take certain measures to preserve order and stability in times
of emergency.46 The scope of each of these powers is subject to robust
debate and there are powers that I have not mentioned, but the point
is simply that the President has numerous substantive powers that
derive from the Constitution.
B. STATUTORY POWERS
What has received far less attention than the breadth of these
constitutional powers is the breadth of statutory powers delegated
41. Jack Goldsmith, Zivotofsky II as Precedent in the Executive Branch, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 112, 112 (2015) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELS. L. §§ 201, 202
cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1987)); see also Zivotofsky ex rel. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076,
2096 (2015) (noting “the exclusive power of the President to control recognition determinations”).
42. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This also likely requires the President to make certain
findings. See, e.g., Qualifications of Pub. Printer, 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 96, 97 (1924) (noting
that the President “determine[s] whether the particular person appointed possessed
the necessary skill to discharge the duties attaching to the position”); The Navy Efficiency Acts, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 335, 351 (1857) (“These facts [relating to the fitness or
unfitness of a person for a particular appointment] it is the duty of the President, in all
cases of nomination to office, to determine as he best may, by personal or by communicated knowledge.”).
43. See United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474 (1915) (“Emergencies
may occur, or conditions may so change as to require that [the President] should, in
the public interest, withhold the land from sale . . . .”).
44. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
45. Rex E. Lee, Executive Privilege, Congressional Subpoena Power, and Judicial Review: Three Branches, Three Powers, and Some Relationships, 1978 BYU L. REV. 231, 251;
see also Assertion of Exec. Privilege in Response to Cong. Demands for L. Enf’t Files, 6
Op. O.L.C. 31, 34–35 (1982); Jonathan David Shaub, The Executive’s Privilege, 70 DUKE
L.J. 1 (2020); Archibald Cox, Executive Privilege, 122 U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (1974).
46. This, of course, requires a relevant emergency, and the conduct in question
must be necessary to address it. See, e.g., Henry P. Monaghan, The Protective Power of
the Presidency, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 10–11, 32–38 (1993) (suggesting such a power exists); Auth To Use Troops To Prevent Interference with Fed. Emps. by Mayday Demonstrations & Consequent Impairment of Gov’t Functions, 1 Supp. Op. O.L.C. 343, 344
(1971) (relying on the “President’s constitutional duty to protect th[e] functioning [of
the government] and prevent its obstruction”). But see Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 646–51 (Jackson, J., concurring) (rejecting argument that President has “inherent” power to “deal with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case”).
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directly to the President by name.47 Such delegations are not siloed to
inconsequential issues, foreign affairs, or military authorities.48 Rather, direct delegations to the President span all manner of substantive areas including trade, disaster and emergency management, as
well as purely domestic powers like combating domestic inflation, setting environmental standards, imposing conditions on government
procurement, and creating national monuments. While there is insufficient space to canvass all delegations to the President, this section
seeks to provide a short survey of the breadth of powers delegated to
the President.
Because there has been less focus on the President’s domestic authorities, this Section starts with a more complete survey of these authorities. It then more briefly surveys the array of powers the President has in foreign affairs, the military, national security, and trade.
1. Domestic Powers
This Section surveys the vast array of areas where the President
has been delegated power over domestic affairs.
Price Stabilization Powers—The President has often possessed
the power to prevent inflation and stabilize prices in the domestic
economy.49 For example, the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 gave
47. See supra note 9. Of course, it has not escaped notice that statutes delegate
power directly to the President, but the focus has tended to be on what sort of legal
deference courts should give the President when she exercises such powers. For example, Kevin Stack has done a great deal of incredibly valuable work in this area. See,
e.g., Stack, The Statutory President, supra note 6, at 542, 585–97 (arguing the President
should receive Chevron deference); Kevin M. Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to
Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 267 (2006); Stack, Reviewability, supra
note 19, at 1177 (arguing the President’s assertions of statutory powers ought to be
subject to ultra vires review); see also Kevin Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of
Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 1013–20 (2007) (arguing that the President is required to
give reasons when acting with binding legal force pursuant to statutory authority). As
noted above, there have also been a number of recent efforts to assess how courts
ought to review presidential exercises of power, but they have not focused on what the
statutory landscape of delegations to the President looks like. See supra note 19. Finally, while scholars have spent a great deal of time assessing the President’s role in
directing the exercise of delegations to agencies in discussing “presidential administration,” they have spent comparatively little time assessing the scope and range of power
delegated directly to the President, rather than to agencies. See supra note 31 (collecting prominent sources on “presidential administration”).
48. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
49. See, e.g., Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen of N. Am. v. Connally,
337 F. Supp. 737, 747–48 (D.D.C. 1971) (discussing history of such authorities). The
broadest delegations in this area—like that of the Economic Stabilization Act of
1970—are no longer in effect, see infra notes 50, 55, but some such powers still remain
and there is little reason to think such broad delegation will not return in the future.
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the President authority to “stabilize prices, rents, wages, salaries, interest rates, dividends and similar transfers,” upon finding that such
restrictions were “appropriate,” and making “such adjustments as
may be necessary to prevent gross inequities.”50 President Nixon used
this authority to impose a general ninety-day freeze on prices, rents,
wages and salaries in the economy in August 1971.51 President Carter
exercised similar power under the Credit Control Act52 to authorize
the Federal Reserve to regulate certain extensions of credit upon determining that “such action is necessary or appropriate for the purpose of preventing or controlling inflation generated by the extension
of credit in an excessive volume.”53 The relevant regulations sought to
“curb[] the volume of credit available” to consumers in the domestic
economy by requiring certain financial institutions, such as commercial banks and money market funds, to increase deposits before they
could extend consumer credit.54 These statutes have since expired,55
but the President continues to have various authorities to combat inflation through means such as initiating policies “for alleviating shortages of goods, services, labor, and capital . . . to aid in stabilizing
prices,” and establishing “stockpiles of agricultural commodities and
other critical materials to help stabilize prices, meet emergency needs,
and promote adequate income to producers.”56 The President can also
50. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-379, § 202, 84 Stat. 799,
799–800 (“The President is authorized to issue such orders and regulations as he may
deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and salaries at levels not less than
those prevailing on May 25, 1970. Such orders and regulations may provide for the
making of such adjustments as may be necessary to prevent gross inequities.”); see also
John J. Rigby, Note, The Administration of Economic Controls: The Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, 29 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 458, 458 n.1 (1979) (describing Acts that
amended and extended the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970). The Act of May 18,
1971, Pub. L. No. 92-15, sec. 3, § 202(b), 85 Stat. 38, 38 (amending the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970), prohibited the President from singling out a “particular industry or segment of the economy,” unless he found that “prices or wages in that industry
or segment of the economy have increased at a rate which is grossly disproportionate
to the rate at which prices or wages have increased in the economy generally.”
51. Exec. Order No. 11,615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15,727, § 1(a) (Aug. 15, 1971).
52. See Exec. Order No. 12,201, 45 Fed. Reg. 17,123 (Mar. 14, 1980).
53. The President’s Auth. To Regulate Extensions of Credit Under the Credit Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 207, 207 (1980) (quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1904 (1976)).
54. Id. at 209–10.
55. See Rigby, supra note 50 (noting the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 expired April 30, 1974); 12 U.S.C. § 1910 (1988) (“The authority conferred by this chapter expires at the close of June 30, 1982.”).
56. 15 U.S.C. § 1022e(c); see also 15 U.S.C. § 713d-2(a) (requiring the President to
carry out a program of food and feed conservation to alleviate shortages and stabilize
prices).
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take “such other administrative actions . . . as the President deems desirable, to promote reasonable price stability.”57
Government Procurement, Organization, and Employment—Apart
from these inflation-related powers, the President also has numerous
powers relating to government procurement and organization. Perhaps most consequentially, the President has the power to impose
regulations on how the government contracts for procurement—
which makes up approximately ten percent of gross domestic product58—so long as she determines the regulations will promote economy and efficiency.59 This authority has been used, for example, to ensure government contractors do not engage in housing discrimination
or punish striking workers.60 The President is also tasked with setting
“Governmentwide goals” for the federal government to award contracts to small businesses owned by women, service-disabled veterans, and “socially and economically disadvantaged” individuals.61 The
President is also delegated power to issue regulations to require cars
bought or leased by executive branch agencies to achieve a minimal
average fuel economy62 and to ensure contracting employers take “affirmative action” to employ “qualified individuals with disabilities.”63
Outside of the government contracting space, the President has
numerous powers relating to government employees. She is tasked
with issuing regulations governing admission into the civil service
that “will best promote the efficiency of that service,” and in particular
she has the power to “ascertain the fitness of applicants as to age,
health, character, knowledge, and ability for the employment
57. 15 U.S.C. § 1022e(c).
58. See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., GOVERNMENT AT A GLANCE 2017, at 173
fig.9.1 (2017), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/gov_glance-2017-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2PR8-JMYH].
59. See Auth. To Issue Exec. Ord. on Gov’t Procurement, 19 Op. O.L.C. 90, 90
(1995) (concluding that the President can promulgate regulations governing procurement contracts if she determines regulations “will promote economy and efficiency in
government procurement”); 40 U.S.C. §§ 101, 121(a) (“The purpose of this subtitle is
to provide the Federal Government with an economical and efficient system for [procurement,]” and the “President may prescribe policies and directives that the President considers necessary to carry out this subtitle.”).
60. See, e.g., Robert B. Cash, Note, Presidential Power: Use and Enforcement of Executive Orders, 39 NOTRE DAME LAW. 44, 45 (1963–1964) (discussing housing discrimination order); Auth. To Issue Exec. Ord. on Gov’t Procurement, supra note 59, at 91
(discussing executive order barring government agencies from contracting with employers that permanently replace striking workers).
61. 15 U.S.C. § 644(g)(1).
62. 49 U.S.C. § 32917(b).
63. 29 U.S.C. § 793(a).
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sought.”64 The President is tasked with calculating locality pay adjustments for federal employees65 and determining the compensation of
certain commission members.66 The President also has power to implement various employment protections on government agencies, including by issuing regulations enforcing the Civil Rights Act, Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act,
Family and Medical Leave Act, and the Fair Labor Standards Act.67
Appropriations and Debt Ceiling—The President has the power to
close appropriation accounts and cancel remaining balances if she
“determines that the purpose for which the appropriation was made
have been carried out”68 and to approve borrowing past the debt ceiling if she determines that spending is within a certain amount of the
existing limit and that “further borrowing is required to meet existing
commitments.”69
Environment, Public Lands, Energy, and Agriculture—Apart from
these powers relating to government organization and spending, the
President also has numerous authorities relating to the environment,
public lands, energy, and agriculture.
For example, the President has the power to determine “by regulation” the prohibited amount of “quantities of oil and any hazardous
substances the discharge of which may be harmful to the public health
or welfare or the environment of the United States.”70 The President
is also delegated the power to publish a highly consequential set of
regulations called the “national contingency plan,” which establishes
the procedures for the federal response to oil and chemical spills, including methods to remove such hazardous materials, how to discover
which facilities are releasing them, “provision for identification, procurement, maintenance, and storage of response equipment and supplies,” as well as methods to “identify[], remov[e], or remedy[] releases of hazardous substances.”71 The President has a separate
power to clean up oil spills and to give loans to affected fishermen

64. 5 U.S.C. § 3301(1)–(2).
65. Id. § 5304(a)–(d).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 1962b-5(c).
67. 3 U.S.C. §§ 411–413, 421.
68. 31 U.S.C. § 1555.
69. Id. § 3101A(a).
70. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)–(4). This authority has been subdelegated by the President but could, of course, be taken back and exercised by the President if she desired.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 9605(a). The President can also acquire real property if doing so is
“needed to conduct [such] a remedial action.” Id. § 9604(a), (j)(1).
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under such “flexible terms, as [she] determine[s].”72 And the President
has a range of powers to exempt federal agencies from compliance
with various environmental regulations if she determines doing so is
in the “paramount interest of the United States.”73
Apart from these environmental powers, the President has the
power to create national monuments by proclaiming that there are
“historic landmarks” or “other objects of historic or scientific interest . . . situated on land owned or controlled by the Federal Government” and ensuring the protected area is confined to “the smallest
area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects
to be protected.”74 The President can also authorize prospecting for
water resources and the establishment of power projects, transmission lines, or road construction in national forests so long as she determines such uses of “the specific area will better serve the interests
of the United States and the people thereof than will its denial.”75
The President also has power to decide the appropriate system
for certain crude oil transport upon considering “the environmental
impacts of the proposed systems,” “transportation costs and delivered
prices of crude oil by region,” “construction schedules,” and the “net
national economic costs and benefits of each such system.”76 And the
President can suspend deep sea exploration or prohibit licensing of
such exploration upon making certain findings.77
The President also has agriculture-related powers, such as the
authority to dispose of commodity set-asides through various means,
including “donation to school-lunch programs.”78
Domestic Emergencies—While it is now relatively well-known
that the President has power to respond to foreign-based emergencies, she also has authority to respond to domestic emergencies. The
President can declare a “severe energy supply interruption,” giving
72. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2711–2712, 2713(e)–(f). The President can also assess civil penalties on shipping vessels that carry inadequate insurance upon taking into account
the “nature, circumstances, extent, and gravity of the violation.” Id. §§ 2716(a),
2716a(a).
73. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1456(c)(1) (coastal zone management requirements); 33
U.S.C. § 1323(a) (federal facilities pollution control); 42 U.S.C. § 300h-7(h) (wellhead
protection requirements); id. § 4903(b) (noise emission regulations); id. § 8373(a)
(powerplant and industrial fuel use regulations).
74. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a)–(b); see also 16 U.S.C. § 81a (requiring the President to
establish boundaries of “Colonial National Historical Park” in Virginia).
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1133(d)(4).
76. 43 U.S.C. § 2007(a)–(b).
77. 30 U.S.C. § 1411(b)(2).
78. 7 U.S.C. § 1743(a).
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her a range of powers including the power to ration or prohibit certain
uses of fuels, like coal or petroleum, as well as to draw down the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.79 Similarly, if the President declares a “natural gas supply emergency” she can order the prohibition of burning
natural gas by power plants80 and subpoena witnesses or documents
or require people to submit answers to “interrogatories” in order to
gather information to aid in her response.81
The President can also provide funding for “small impoverished
communit[ies]” for “predisaster hazard mitigation measures,” order
the removal of debris resulting from major disasters from domestic
public or private lands, and provide local governments and private actors grants to do so.82 The President can provide financial assistance,
temporary housing, and money for repairs or replacement for those
“displaced from their . . . primary residences.”83 And the President can
provide medical, dental, childcare, funeral, and transportation expenses to those adversely affected by a major disaster.84
If the President determines there is a “major violent crime or
drug-related emergency,” the President can send federal “personnel,
equipment, supplies, facilities, financial assistance” and provide “law
enforcement-related intelligence information” upon determining
such assistance is needed “to save lives, and to protect property and
public health and safety.”85
Immigration—The President also has important immigration authorities. As made famous by President Trump’s “Travel Ban,” the
President can bar the entry of certain classes of aliens if she determines their entry would be “detrimental to the interests of the United
States.”86 The President also sets the cap for the number of refugees
permitted into the United States by determining the number “justified
by humanitarian concerns or . . . otherwise in the national interest.”87
Beyond the ability to regulate who can enter the country, the

79. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6241(d) (Strategic Petroleum Reserve drawdown and sale
authority); id. § 8374 (coal allocation authority, prohibition on use of natural gas or
petroleum); id. § 8511(a) (set conservation targets).
80. 15 U.S.C. § 717z(a)–(c).
81. Id. § 3364(a)(1).
82. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5133, 5173.
83. Id. § 5174(a)–(b).
84. Id. § 5174(e) (outlining financial assistance to address such needs).
85. 34 U.S.C. § 12523(a), (c), (g).
86. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f); see infra notes 172, 237–39 and accompanying text (discussing President Trump’s “Travel Ban”).
87. 8 U.S.C. § 1157(a)(2).
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President has power to monitor, evaluate, and potentially modify employment verification systems.88
2. Foreign Affairs, Military, and National Security
As is perhaps less surprising, the President has a vast array of foreign affairs and military statutory powers. With respect to foreign affairs, the President has numerous powers to sanction both individuals
and countries upon making particular findings that, for example, individuals have engaged in cyberattacks on U.S. democratic institutions
or that countries have tolerated “severe violations of religious freedom” or used chemical weapons.89 The President also has numerous
authorities to grant foreign assistance to countries upon making certain findings, such as that the aid will help alleviate hunger or stop
malaria.90
In terms of military powers, the President can waive statutory
limits on military end strength if she declares an emergency,91 waive
requirements for appointing combatant commanders in a number of
different services,92 and issue regulations governing disability and
death compensation for service members.93 The President can also
determine who has “distinguished himself conspicuously by gallantry
and intrepidity at risk of his life above and beyond the call of duty”
such that a medal of honor is deserved,94 determine which soldiers
can receive benefits for being held in “captive status,” adjust monthly
pay, and adjust the “components and quantities of navy rations” upon
88. Id. § 1324a(d) (authority to monitor and change employment verification system).
89. 22 U.S.C. §§ 6442, 6445 (religious freedom); id. § 9524(a) (Russian cyberattacks). The President can also sanction individuals for, among other things, being complicit in corruption in Russia, undermining peace or security in Ukraine, being complicit in human rights abuses, participating in economic sectors in Iran, and knowingly
aiding a chemical weapons program. See id. § 8908 (Russia); id. § 8907 (Ukraine); id.
§ 8910(a) (human rights abuses); id. § 8803 (Iran); 50 U.S.C. § 4613 (chemical weapons).
90. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 1728a (food for peace); 22 U.S.C. § 2151b-4 (malaria). The
President also has authority to provide aid to help countries reduce their dependence
on the production of drug crops, to provide long-term development assistance for subSaharan Africa, to provide human rights security assistance, as well as assistance for
refugees and migration. See 7 U.S.C. § 1736g-1(b) (drug crops); id. § 1728a (food for
peace); 22 U.S.C. § 2293 (sub-Saharan Africa); id. § 2304 (human rights assistance); id.
§ 2601 (refugees and migration).
91. 10 U.S.C. § 123a.
92. Id. §§ 154, 164, 8033, 8043.
93. Id. § 1032.
94. Id. § 7271.

2021]

PRESIDENTIAL LAW

1289

determining the “economy and health and comfort of the members . . .
require such action.”95
During war, the President has tremendous power to seize property, apprehend and remove foreign nationals, and procure ships and
other war material.96 And, outside wartime, the President can “create,
maintain, protect, expand, or restore domestic industrial base capabilities essential for national defense.”97 This power includes the ability
to purchase industrial resources or critical technology, develop production capacities, encourage “exploration, development, and mining
of critical and strategic materials,” and provide subsidies for developers of such materials.98 The President also has wide-ranging power to
obtain information through “subpoena, or otherwise” including by inspecting books, records, other writings, or property of “any person as
may be necessary or appropriate, in his discretion, to the enforcement
or the administration of” the President’s defense production authorities.99
The President also has the authority to call out the militia or the
armed forces domestically “to suppress . . . any insurrection, domestic
violence, unlawful combination, or conspiracy” that “so hinders the
execution of the laws of” the relevant state, such that people are deprived of their legal rights, and state authorities “are unable, fail, or
refuse to protect that right.”100
The President can block any merger, acquisition, or takeover
transaction that could result in foreign control of any U.S. business if
she determines the transaction “threatens to impair the national security of the United States” upon finding “credible evidence . . . to believe that a foreign person that would acquire an interest in a United
States business or its assets as a result of the covered transaction
might take action that threatens to impair the national security.”101
And as is now relatively well-known, the President has enormous
power upon declaring foreign policy “emergencies,” even outside
95. 37 U.S.C. § 559 (captive status); id. § 1009(e) (adjust monthly pay); 10 U.S.C.
§ 8242 (Navy rations). The President can also issue regulations governing disability
and death compensation and waive consent requirements for drug tests on military
members. See 10 U.S.C. §§ 1032, 1107.
96. 50 U.S.C. § 4307 (property seizure); id. § 2404 (prohibit exports); id. § 21 (expel foreign nationals); id. § 82 (ships and material); id. § 98h-4 (import strategic materials).
97. Id. § 4533.
98. Id.
99. 50 U.S.C. § 4555(a).
100. 10 U.S.C. § 253.
101. 50 U.S.C. § 4565(d).
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wartime.102 For example, under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, the President can regulate or prohibit foreign exchange transactions, transfers of credit, transfers of securities, payments, and can take or freeze assets, block property and interests in
property, and deny entry into the United States.103
3. Trade
The President also has numerous trade and export authorities.
The President can impose fees on imports if she investigates and concludes that such imports would “reduce substantially the amount of
any product processed in the United States.”104 The President can impose duties if she finds a foreign country has imposed burdens on
products of the United States that are not “equally enforced upon the
like articles of every foreign country” and such duties would serve “the
public interest.”105 The President can impose import charges if she determines restricting imports will help “with large and serious United
States balance-of-payment deficits” or prevent depreciation of the
dollar.106 And the President can designate countries “beneficiary developing countries” granting them preferential treatment.107 Finally,
the President has numerous authorities to enter into trade agreements with foreign countries, including highly consequential agreements like the Transpacific Partnership, upon finding they will meet
certain congressional goals.108
C. THE STAKES
What comes into view upon reviewing this survey of powers delegated to the President is how broad an array of consequential powers
102. Elizabeth Goitein, The Alarming Scope of the President’s Emergency Powers,
ATLANTIC (Jan./Feb. 2019), https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/
01/presidential-emergency-powers/576418 [https://perma.cc/3X4Y-68CW] (“The
moment the President declares a ‘national emergency’ . . . more than 100 special provisions become available to him.”); see also A Guide to Emergency Powers and Their Use,
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Apr. 24, 2020), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/
research-reports/guide-emergency-powers-and-their-use [https://perma.cc/S7RK
-AU88] (cataloguing the breadth of presidential emergency powers).
103. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1707; CHRISTOPHER A. CASEY, IAN F. FERGUSSON, DIANNE E.
RENNACK & JENNIFER K. ELSEA, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45618, THE INTERNATIONAL EMERGENCY
ECONOMIC POWERS ACT: ORIGINS, EVOLUTION, AND USE 25–26 (2019) (listing powers
granted to the President by IEEPA and uses of this authority by past presidents).
104. 7 U.S.C. § 624(a)–(b).
105. 19 U.S.C. § 1338(a).
106. Id. § 2132(a); see also id. § 2136 (on reciprocal nondiscriminatory treatment).
107. Id. § 2462.
108. See, e.g., id. § 4202 (trade agreements authority).
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the President has. The President has vast domestic and foreign affairs
powers delegated directly to her—powers that, if exercised by agencies, would typically be subject to well-known and reticulated administrative law requirements. Once we see this range of power, the
stakes of answering the question of whether the President has procedural obligations comes into view.
To say that the President has no procedural obligations is to say
that the President can exercise all these powers arbitrarily.109 It is to
say that Richard Nixon could freeze prices and wages in the economy
without going through any process at all.110 It is to say that President
Carter could limit consumer credit in the economy by finding such action was “necessary or appropriate for the purpose of preventing or
controlling inflation generated by the extension of credit in an excessive volume”111 on a whim. It is to say that the President can decide
“by regulation” the amount of prohibited “hazardous substance” that
could be discharged without consulting any experts or gathering any
information.112 It is to suggest the President can ration energy use
upon declaring an energy supply emergency without investigating
whether such an emergency actually exists or how best to deal with
it.113 In short, it is to say the President can exercise vast control over
our country arbitrarily.
Can it be that the President can exercise such powers without any
procedure at all? If not, what procedures must the President abide by
as a matter of positive law? The next Part seeks to answer these questions.

109. To clarify, I use the word “arbitrary” here and throughout this Article not in a
technical legal sense, such as the word is used in administrative law’s “arbitrary and
capricious” review. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (discussing standard test for “arbitrary
and capricious” review). Rather, I use the word in its ordinary sense in common
speech—to mean that a choice was made essentially at random or based on personal
whim, rather than based on reason, reasonable process, or consideration. See, e.g., Arbitrary, MERRIAM-WEBSTER (Sept. 2020), https://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/arbitrary [https://perma.cc/J7CE-XVPP] (“existing or coming about seemingly at random or by chance or as a capricious and unreasonable act of will”); Arbitrary, OED ONLINE (Sept. 2020), https://oed.com (search “arbitrary”) (“Derived from
mere opinion or preference; not based on the nature of things; hence, capricious, uncertain, varying.”).
110. Exec. Order No. 11615, 36 Fed. Reg. 15507, 15727 (Aug. 17, 1971).
111. The President’s Auth. To Regulate Extensions of Credit Under the Credit Control Act, 43 Op. Att’y Gen. 207, 208 n.2 (1980).
112. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)–(4).
113. 42 U.S.C. § 6202(8).
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II. THE PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO DELIBERATE
This Part argues that the President has existing procedural obligations in exercising power that is delegated directly to her. The President has a duty to deliberate, i.e., to gather relevant information and
make a considered judgment based upon that information before exercising power.114
My method for deriving this duty is quite standard, but it has yet
to be done with respect to the President’s procedural obligations. I
start, as is typical, with the text of the Constitution. I find that the Constitution’s text supports such a duty but may not be concrete enough
to firmly establish it. So rather than relying solely on the text, I explore
the primary source of positive constitutional law today: Supreme
Court precedent. The scholarship in this domain has not attempted a
thorough exploration of what Supreme Court cases examining presidential power have to say about the President’s existing procedural
obligations. And, it turns out that they say quite a lot. Although the
Court has not addressed the President’s procedural obligations explicitly, it has made clear in a wide variety of substantive areas that it
views the President as tasked with gathering relevant information and
making a considered judgment before exercising power delegated directly to her. Unearthing this duty may make it seem novel, but it is
also supported by a long history of internal executive branch opinions
that also assumed the President is tasked with gathering relevant information and making a considered judgment before exercising
power. Below, I first show how the text supports such a duty, then focus primarily on how Supreme Court precedent supports it, before
discussing the long history of internal executive branch advice that
also supports the duty. This Part then examines whether the duty applies to constitutional as well as statutory authorities and concludes
by discussing what the duty entails.
A. TEXT
The text of the Constitution suggests the President has procedural obligations in exercising power. The Take Care Clause requires
that the President “shall take care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”115 According to Founding-era dictionaries, to be “faithful”
114. As with many procedural obligations, this duty is a standard—what precisely
it will require in each instance might change depending on the condition that triggers
the power. See infra Part II.E.
115. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (Take Care Clause). The Oath Clause also requires “faithful” execution. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“Before he enter on the execution of his office,
he shall take the following [o]ath or [a]ffirmation:—‘I do solemnly swear (or affirm)
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execution must be done “[w]ithout failure of performance; honestly;
exactly.”116 Recent groundbreaking work on the original public meaning of the term suggests that to qualify as “faithful,” execution must be
done “diligently” or “care[fully].”117 From this we might easily conclude that if there is a duty to exercise power “diligently,” “care[fully],”
or “without failure of performance” then something must be performed—some internal process must be used.118 Thus, if a power requires some predicate factual or policy determination to be made—as
is true of all the powers discussed above119—for that determination
to be made “diligently,” “care[fully],” or “without failure of performance,” the President must gather relevant information, evaluate it,
and make a considered, careful judgment about whether the relevant
determination can be made.120 The President need not go to the ends
of the earth, but she must do what any reasonable fiduciary agent
that I will faithfully execute the office of President of the United States[.]’”); see also
Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2113 (discussing faithful execution duty). Of course, the
Due Process Clause of course bears on presidential action, at least where deprivations
of life, liberty, or property are at issue. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No Person shall . . .
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”). Because I am
examining the President’s first-order obligations regardless of whether a protected
Due Process interest is implicated, in this Section, I focus on the obligations imposed
by Article II of the Constitution.
116. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 855 (quoting Faithfully, 1 SAMUEL JOHNSON,
A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (London, J.F. & C. Rivington eds., 6th ed. 1785));
accord Jack Goldsmith & John F. Manning, The Protean Take Care Clause, 164 U. PA. L.
REV. 1835, 1857–58 (2016) (quoting Founding-era dictionaries as stating the same or
similarly in defining “faithful”); Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2118 (“[F]aithful execution
was repeatedly associated in statutes and other legal documents with true, honest, diligent, due, skillful, careful, good faith, and impartial execution of law or office.”). This
is also consistent with modern definitions of the term “faithfully.” See Roisman, supra
note 18, at 856 n.140.
117. See, e.g., Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2179 (“[T]he President must act diligently and in good faith, taking affirmative steps to pursue what is in the best interest
of his national constituency. . . . The command of diligence, care, and good faith contain
an affirmative, prescriptive component.”).
118. I have made an analogous argument relating to the President’s finding of
predicate facts but excluded the exercise of policy judgment from the analysis. See
Roisman, supra note 18, at 856 (“This requirement of ‘performance’ or ‘exact[itude]’
suggests that the President must engage in some sort of reasonable inquiry—some
process—to find these facts.”); see also Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2190 (“[F]aithful
execution requires affirmative effort on the part of the President to pursue diligently
and in good faith the interests of the principal or purpose specified by the authorizing
instrument or entity.”).
119. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
120. See Roisman, supra note 18, at 856; see also Bernick, supra note 18, at 5 (arguing that the Take Care Clause requires that the President “must exercise that [delegated] discretion with reasonable care”); Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2179.
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would do to “faithful[ly]” fulfill the task of making a relevant determination.121
But, while the plain text and the fiduciary principles thought to
attach to it support some procedural duties—including a duty to
gather information and make a considered judgment based on such
information—the terms of the Take Care Clause are famously
vague.122 As much as they might support a duty to deliberate—or
many other procedural duties—their vagueness and contestability
are thus unlikely to serve as an exclusive foundation for understanding the President’s procedural obligations today.123
121. See Kent et al., supra note 18, at 2119 (concluding faithful execution clauses
imposed “fiduciary” duties); Bernick, supra note 18, at 5 (agreeing with this view).
122. See, e.g., Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 116, at 1836 (describing varied and
inconsistent use of the “delphic” Take Care Clause).
The Take Care Clause is not the only relevant provision here. The Opinions Clause
provides that the President “may require the opinion, in writing, of the principal officer
in each of the executive departments, upon any subject relating to the duties of their
respective offices.” U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. This explicitly gives the President the power
to ask principal officers to gather relevant information and give their views in writing.
In other words, it provides power to engage in a particular form of deliberation. The
permissive language, however, might suggest that the President need not always consult with such officials before exercising power. And, in an important new article, Tara
Grove has argued that the Opinions Clause’s use of the word “may” “makes clear that
the President has no duty to engage in such consultation.” See Tara Leigh Grove, Presidential Laws and the Missing Interpretive Theory, 168 U. PA. L. REV. 877, 882, 898
(2020). I agree with Grove that there are instances of exercises of presidential power
that do not require such consultation. But even accepting this view, the fact that the
Opinions Clause gives the President the explicit power to ask certain officers for written opinions does not mean that the Constitution never requires consultation. It is possible that some exercises of power need not be done via such consultation. For example, if an authority is given to the President by name and she already has all the relevant
information, the President would not be mandated to ask for a written opinion (or any
opinion) of a principal officer, because faithful execution would not require such a
written opinion. So, while it is true that neither the Opinions Clause nor the Take Care
Clause require consultation in every exercise of power, this does not mean that the
Constitution never requires consultation. In short, one can reasonably believe both that
(1) the President is not always obligated to ask principal officers for written opinions
before exercising power, and (2) the President’s duty to faithfully execute the law requires her to gather relevant information and make a considered judgment before determining a requisite condition has been satisfied, which will sometimes require consultation.
123. See supra note 18. In short, even if one accepts that these terms bind the President, it is hard to know what such requirements mean concretely for regulating the
modern President without evaluating other sources of law. And of course, many might
not accept that the obligations identified in these originalist accounts bind the President at all. Some do not subscribe to originalism and even those inclined to agree with
it might not agree with the precise originalist methodology used. For example, Bernick
relies on a distinct “letter” and “spirit” approach to originalism that looks not only to
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Rather than seeking to identify and ground the President’s procedural duties in contestable claims about either the Founding-era or
modern meaning of the term “faithful,” this Article takes a different
tack. It looks to Supreme Court case law to assess whether the Court
has viewed the President as having procedural obligations and what
they might entail. It follows this examination of Supreme Court precedent with a survey of how executive branch legal advisers have understood the President’s procedural requirements before exercising delegated power. The next two Sections, thus, seek to expand on this
principle of “conscientious” or “diligent” execution to show that the
President has long been understood, albeit implicitly, to have a duty
to deliberate—in particular to gather relevant information and make
a considered judgment—before exercising power delegated directly
to her.
B. SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
Looking to Supreme Court case law evaluating presidential exercises of power, we find much more. In a wide variety of substantive
areas—ranging from the nondelegation doctrine, to the presumption
of regularity, to deference to presidential informational and judgmental advantages, to executive privilege, to the President’s veto power,
to Trump v. Hawaii—the Court has made clear that it viewed the President as under an obligation to gather relevant information and make
a considered judgment before making a determination triggering the
exercise of presidential power. Although this duty has never been explicitly stated by the Court, it provides the premise for the Court’s review of the President’s conduct in all these cases. Below, I survey how
these cases establish that the Court has long viewed the President as
bound by a duty to deliberate before exercising power. I then address
a potential counterargument to this doctrinal analysis that the cases

the plain text of the Take Care Clause (the “letter”), but also to what are determined to
be the original functions of the clause (the “spirit”). Bernick, supra note 18, at 5. Bernick states the “spirit” of the Take Care clause includes “(1) ensuring presidential accountability; (2) facilitating the exercise of bounded presidential discretion; (3) securing the rule of law; and (4) thwarting presidential opportunism.” Id. at 6. But some
might be skeptical that the functions of the “spirit” Bernick identifies are the only functions members of the Founding era would have believed the Clause might serve, and
might question how we are to pick among such functions or how these functions ought
to be applied to the modern President. Focusing on Supreme Court precedent and the
history of internal executive branch advice might help identify more concrete procedural requirements that bind the President today based on a perhaps less contestable
source of law.
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only typify an assumption about what the President ought to do rather
than what she must do.
1. Nondelegation Doctrine
First, a number of nondelegation cases make clear that when the
President’s power is premised on making certain factual or policy determinations, she must engage in some form of information gathering
and reasoned consideration before making the relevant determination.
In one of the foundational nondelegation doctrine cases, Field v.
Clark, the Court upheld a delegation of authority to impose tariffs on
certain foreign countries if the President “deem[ed] [the duties imposed by those countries] to be reciprocally unequal or unreasonable.”124 The Court found that “[t]he words ‘he may deem’ . . . of course,
implied that the president would examine the commercial regulations
of other countries . . . and form a judgment as to whether they were
reciprocally equal and reasonable, or the contrary, in their effect upon
American products.”125 It then found the delegation permissible because the President “was the mere agent of the law-making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will
was to take effect.”126 In short, the Court upheld the Act precisely because the President’s duty was to ascertain the existence of a condition, which he was to do after “examin[ing]” the relevant regulations
and “form[ing] a judgment” as to whether the condition was met.127
The Court went further to explain that such conditional legislative delegation was common because “[t]here are many things upon
which wise and useful legislation must depend which cannot be
known to the law-making power, and must therefore be a subject of
inquiry and determination outside of the halls of legislation.”128 Again,
the Court clearly assumed the President would engage in “inquiry”
and then make a “determination” before exercising the relevant
power. In short, the Court assumed that when the President is delegated power subject to a condition, before finding the condition satisfied, the President must first gather relevant information and make a
considered judgment based on that information.
Another foundational nondelegation case, J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co.
v. United States, also supports this duty. There, the Court evaluated a
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

143 U.S. 649, 680 (1892).
Id. at 693.
Id. at 693–94 (emphasis added).
See id. at 680.
Id. at 694 (quoting Appeal of Locke, 72 Pa. 491, 499 (1873)).
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delegation allowing the President to adjust import duties whenever
the President determined such adjustment necessary to “equalize . . .
differences in costs of production in the United States and the principal competing country.”129 In upholding the delegation, the Court
noted that “it was presumed that the President would through [the]
body of advisers [provided by the statute to assist him in obtaining
needed data and ascertaining the facts justifying readjustments] keep
himself advised of the necessity for investigation or change, and then
would proceed to pursue his duties under the Act and reach such conclusion as he might find justified by the investigation, and proclaim
the same.”130 Again, in upholding the delegation, the Court assumed
the President had a duty to engage in relevant fact gathering and deliberation to reach “such conclusion as he might find justified by the
investigation.”131 Importantly, the statute did not require the President to make such investigations at any particular time, but the Court
nonetheless viewed the President as under an implied duty to gather
information to determine whether the authority should be exercised.
This requirement is also supported by Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan, where the Court invalidated a delegation to ban transport of socalled “hot oil” precisely because there were no conditions for the
President to ascertain before exercising the power.132 In other words,
because there was nothing for the President to inquire into and make
a considered judgment about before exercising power, the delegation
was unconstitutional.
Justice Cardozo dissented, but not because he did not think such
a duty existed. To the contrary, Cardozo believed the statute contained
a condition the President had to find before exercising power. Cardozo
thus viewed the delegation as constitutional precisely because the
President’s power was contingent on gathering relevant information
and making a considered judgment: “What [the President] does is to
inquire into the industrial facts as they exist from time to time . . . . He is
to study the facts objectively, the violation of a standard impelling him
to action or inaction according to its observed effect upon [the

129. J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 401 (1928).
130. Id. at 405.
131. Id.
132. Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 431–32 (1935) (“To hold that he is free
to select as he chooses from the many and various objects generally described in the
first section, and then to act without making any finding with respect to any object that
he does select, and the circumstances properly related to that object, would be in effect
to make the conditions inoperative and to invest him with an uncontrolled legislative
power.”).
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ultimate goal of] industrial recovery.”133 In Cardozo’s estimation, because the law required the President to find certain conditions before
exercising power, Congress had imposed “a mandate to inquire and
determine whether the conditions in that particular industry were
such at any given time as to make restriction helpful to the declared
objectives of the act.”134 In short, Justice Cardozo assumed that because the President had to find a condition to exercise power, he had
a duty of inquiry and objectivity in gathering information and making
the relevant finding. “[T]he law presumes that the declaration [by the
President would be] preceded by due inquiry and that it was rooted
in sufficient grounds.”135 Again, for the President to exercise power,
he had to first gather relevant information and then make a considered judgment based on such information.
These cases are all famous, but they are not unique. The Court has
frequently upheld delegations to the President precisely because it
viewed the President as under an implied duty to gather relevant information about conditions triggering power and make a reasonable
judgment based on such information.136 The nondelegation doctrine
133. Id. at 437–38 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (emphasis added); id. at 438 (“[Congress] laid upon [the President] a mandate to inquire and determine whether the conditions in that particular industry were such at any given time as to make restriction
helpful to the declared objectives of the act and to the ultimate attainment of industrial
recovery.”); id. at 437 (“All that Congress could safely do was to declare the act to be
done and the policies to be promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power the ascertainment of the shifting facts that would determine the relation between the doing of
the act and the attainment of the stated ends. That is what it did. It said to the President
in substance: You are to consider whether the transportation of oil in excess of the statutory quotas is offensive to one or more of the policies enumerated . . . . If [so] . . . you
may then by a prohibitory order eradicate the mischief.” (emphasis added)).
134. Id. at 438.
135. Id. at 444.
136. See Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 104 (1943) (“The essentials of
the legislative function are preserved when Congress authorizes a statutory command
to become operative, upon ascertainment of a basic conclusion of fact by a designated
representative of the Government.”); Opp Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Adm’r of the Wage &
Hour Div. of the Dep’t of Lab., 312 U.S. 126, 145 (1941) (“Th[e] essentials [of the legislative function] are preserved when Congress specifies the basic conclusions of fact
upon ascertainment of which, from relevant data by a designated administrative
agency, it ordains that its statutory command is to be effective.”); United States v.
Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 12 (1926) (“It was peculiarly within the province of the
Commander-in-Chief to know the facts and to determine what disposition should be
made of enemy properties in order effectively to carry on the war. The determination
of the terms of sales of enemy properties in the light of facts and conditions from time
to time arising in the progress of war was not the making of a law; it was the application
of the general rule laid down by the Act.” (emphasis added)); Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n
Am. R.R.s., 575 U.S. 43, 81 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“Congress had created a
‘named contingency,’ in Field v. Clark, ‘and the President was the mere agent of the law-
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is thus built on a premise of the existence of a duty to deliberate. After
all, if the President could exercise power completely arbitrarily—on a
whim—then the doctrine would be pointless: the conditions the President must find would be rendered meaningless.137 The President
would then be able to exercise power based on her own will, rather
than that of Congress—the precise opposite of the purpose of the nondelegation doctrine.138
Of course, the nondelegation doctrine today has been described
as “toothless.”139 But the reason the nondelegation doctrine has fallen
into disuse (for now)140 is not because the Court has decided that conditions the executive must find satisfied can be found arbitrarily, but
rather because it concluded that Congress could give executive branch
actors broad leeway in identifying what precise conditions have to be
satisfied. And if, as some suspect, a more robust nondelegation doctrine is revived by the current majority on the Supreme Court, the proposed new formulations of the test on offer would even more obviously require deliberation. There may now be a majority on the Court
willing to overturn the prevailing “intelligible principle” test in favor
of one permitting only grants of authority to conduct “executive factfinding” or to “fill up the details” of legislation.141 If the Court were to
adopt this narrower formulation of the test this would even more obviously assume the President must gather relevant information and
make a considered judgment before exercising power. It makes no
making department to ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will
was to take effect.’” (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394,
410–11 (1928))); cf. A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541
(1935) (holding that unlike permissible delegations, the unconstitutional statute at issue “does not . . . prescribe rules of conduct to be applied to particular states of fact
determined by appropriate administrative procedure”).
137. See Pan. Refin. Co., 293 U.S. at 439 (Cardozo, J., dissenting) (“Either the statute
means that the President is to adhere to the declared policy of Congress, or it means
that he is to exercise a merely arbitrary will. The one construction invigorates the act;
the other saps its life. A choice between them is not hard.”).
138. See Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 537–38 (“Congress cannot delegate legislative power to the President to exercise an unfettered discretion to make whatever laws
he thinks may be needed or advisable . . . .”).
139. See, e.g., Kathryn A. Watts, Rulemaking as Legislating, 103 GEO. L.J. 1003, 1016
(2015).
140. There may now be a majority on the Court willing to overturn the prevailing
“intelligible principle” test in favor of one permitting only grants of authority to conduct “executive fact-finding,” to “fill up the details” of legislation, or where the President already has inherent constitutional authority. See Gundy v. United States, 139 S.
Ct. 2116, 2136–37 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting).
141. See id. Justice Gorsuch also argues delegations would be permissible where
the President already has inherent authority. Id.
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sense to limit delegations to such contexts if one assumes the delegate
can arbitrarily find whatever facts or fill in whatever details she
wishes without engaging in any deliberation. In any event, while the
Court has not struck down a statute on nondelegation grounds since
1935, even the Court’s phrasing of the prevailing intelligible principle
test is illustrative.142 To apply a principle that is “intelligible,” one
must consider and decipher it—one must deliberate.
In short, a review of the Court’s nondelegation case law reveals
that the Court has long assumed that if the President must find a condition to exercise power, she must gather relevant information and
make a considered judgment before concluding the condition has
been satisfied.
2. Deference to the President’s Information and Judgment
A host of well-known Supreme Courts cases deferring to presidential exercises of judgment also support this duty. In these cases,
the Court defers because it assumes the President possesses the ability to gather and assess information in a manner superior to that of
the Court or Congress. These cases necessarily assume that the President will utilize these informational and judgmental advantages in exercising the relevant power.
The Court’s decision in Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp. is illustrative.143 There, the Court found it
could not review the President’s disagreement with a Civil Aeronautics Board’s recommendation that it would serve the public interest to deny a certificate authorizing an air route to a particular company.144 The relevant statute gave the President “unconditional”
authority to approve, disapprove, or modify the Board’s recommendation.145 In deferring to the President, the Court noted that
[t]he President, both as Commander-in-Chief and as the Nation’s organ for
foreign affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not to be published to the world. It would be intolerable that courts,
without the relevant information, should review and perhaps nullify actions
of the Executive taken on information properly held secret. . . . But even if
courts could require full disclosure, the very nature of executive decisions as
to foreign policy is political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided
by our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of
prophecy. . . . They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has neither

142.
143.
144.
145.

J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928).
333 U.S. 103 (1948).
Id. at 105–06.
Id. at 106.
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aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been held to belong
in the domain of political power not subject to judicial intrusion or inquiry.146

Here, the Court made clear that its deference was based upon a belief
that the President had access to better information and that he would
make a “delicate” and “complex” decision involving “large elements of
prophecy.”147 Clearly the Court assumed the President would gather
relevant information and make a considered judgment based on it.
This conception is also supported by United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., where the Court deferred to the President’s finding that the prohibition of the sale of certain arms to Bolivia and Paraguay “may contribute to the reestablishment of peace between those
countries.”148 The Court premised its deference on the notion that the
President “has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions
which prevail in foreign countries . . . [including through] his confidential sources of information.”149 It ultimately concluded that “there is
sufficient warrant for the broad discretion vested in the President to
determine whether the enforcement of the statute will have a beneficial effect upon the reestablishment of peace in the affected countries.”150 Of course, the Court was envisioning that such a “determin[ation]” would be made upon the confidential information and
sources it had viewed itself as bound not to reveal.151
This notion is also present in United States v. George S. Bush & Co.,
where the Court held that it could not second-guess the President’s
determination that a rate of duty recommended by a trade

146. Id. at 111 (emphasis added).
147. Id.; cf. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 583 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(“First, with respect to certain decisions relating to national security and foreign affairs, the courts simply lack the relevant information and expertise to second-guess
determinations made by the President based on information properly withheld. Second, even if the courts could compel the Executive to produce the necessary information, such decisions are simply not amenable to judicial determination because
‘[t]hey are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’” (quoting Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. at 111)).
148. 299 U.S. 304, 330 (1936).
149. Id. at 320; see also id. at 321 (“When the President is to be authorized by legislation to act in respect of a matter intended to affect a situation in foreign territory,
the legislator properly bears in mind . . . [that] the President’s action . . . may well depend, among other things, upon the nature of the confidential information which he
has or may thereafter receive . . . .”).
150. Id. at 329 (emphasis added).
151. Id. at 319; id. at 320 (“Secrecy in respect of information gathered by [the President’s confidential sources of information] may be highly necessary, and the premature disclosure of it productive of harmful results.”).

1302

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1269

commission would “equalize the differences in the domestic and foreign costs of production” of canned clams.152 The Court found that
the judgment of the President that on the facts, adduced in pursuance of the
procedure prescribed by Congress, a change of rate is necessary is no more
subject to judicial review under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself
had exercised that judgment. It has long been held that where Congress has
authorized a public officer to take some specified legislative action when in
his judgment that action is necessary or appropriate to carry out the policy
of Congress, the judgment of the officer as to the existence of the facts calling
for that action is not subject to review.153

Once again, the Court was deferring, precisely because it did not want
to displace the considered “judgment” of the President based on the
gathered facts.
3. Presumption of Regularity
The Court’s cases on the presumption of regularity also support
the notion that the President is obligated to gather relevant information and make a considered judgment based on that information.
In Martin v. Mott, the Court explained that it would defer to the President’s finding that there was an “imminent danger of invasion” such
that he could call forth a militia, because “the evidence upon which the
President might decide that there is imminent danger of invasion,
might be of a nature not constituting strict technical proof, or the disclosure of the evidence might reveal important secrets of state, which
the public interest . . . might imperiously demand to be kept in concealment.”154 The Court noted the President “is necessarily constituted the judge of the existence of the exigency in the first instance,
and is bound to act according to his belief of the facts.”155 The Court
thus envisioned the President gathering relevant information and
making a considered judgment on it.156 As Justice Cardozo later put it
in describing this presumption, “[t]he will to act being declared, the
law presumes that the declaration was preceded by due inquiry and
that it was rooted in sufficient grounds.”157 Again, the Court premised
its decision to defer on the assumption that the President would

152. 310 U.S. 371, 379 (1940).
153. Id. at 379–80 (emphasis added).
154. 25 U.S. 19, 31 (1827).
155. Id.
156. See id. at 32–33 (“When the President exercises an authority confided to him
by law, the presumption is, that it is exercised in pursuance of law.”).
157. Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 444 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting); id.
at 445–46 (“When the President exercises an authority confided to him by law, the
presumption is, that it is exercised in pursuance of law.”).
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gather relevant information and make a considered judgment based
upon it.
4. Executive Privilege
The Court’s executive privilege cases also provide strong support
for the duty of deliberation. Thus, while executive privilege has traditionally been used to block access to the contents of presidential deliberation, its very logic is that such deliberation is necessary for the
President to exercise her powers.
In Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, the Court stated—in
agreement with the Solicitor General—that executive “privilege is
necessary to provide the confidentiality required for the President’s
conduct of office. Unless he can give his advisers some assurance of
confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank
submissions of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his
duties depends.”158 One only has to turn this phrasing around to see
that to “effective[ly] discharge . . . his duties,” the President must “receive the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions” within the
executive branch. This is a recognition that, for the President to exercise her power, she must gather relevant information and make an informed judgment based on it. Otherwise, protecting this interest as
“necessary” for governance does not make sense.159
Indeed, as Justice Rehnquist put it in dissent, “[g]iven the vast
spectrum of the decisions that confront him . . . it is by no means an
overstatement to conclude that current, accurate, and absolutely candid
information is essential to the proper performance of his office,”160 and
that “[u]nless he can give his advisers some assurance of confidentiality, a President could not expect to receive the full and frank submission of facts and opinions upon which effective discharge of his duties
depends.”161 Justice Rehnquist thus also viewed the President’s gathering of information and making a considered judgment upon it as
necessary or, as he separately put it, “an absolute prerequisite” to the
“effective discharge of [the President’s] duties.”162
158. 433 U.S. 425, 448–49 (1977) (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 501; see also Trump v. Mazars USA, LLP, No. 19-715, slip op. at 13
(U.S. July 9, 2020) (“[Executive] privilege safeguards the public interest in candid, confidential deliberation within the Executive Branch; it is ‘fundamental to the operation
of Government.’” (quoting United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974))).
160. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 551–52 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
161. See id. at 551–52, 558 (emphasis added).
162. See id. at 546–47 (“[C]andid and open discourse among the President, his advisers, foreign heads of state and ambassadors, Members of Congress, and the others
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The Court also acknowledged the necessity of such internal deliberation in United States v. Nixon, noting “[t]he President’s need for
complete candor and objectivity from advisers”163 and “the necessity
for protection of the public interest in candid, objective, and even
blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decisionmaking.”164 As the
Court summed it up, executive privilege serves “the valid need for protection of communications between high Government officials and
those who advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold
duties; the importance of this confidentiality is too plain to require
further discussion.”165
In short, the existence of executive privilege is justified on the notion that the President must gather information and deliberate to exercise her duties. While these statements are not facially incompatible
with the notion that such deliberation is required in some instances
but not necessarily in others, the thrust of the decisions—and the reason the Court deemed such a privilege as constitutionally based—appears to be the assumption that for the President to exercise her duties effectively and lawfully, she must engage in deliberation.
5. Veto Power
The duty to deliberate is also supported by the Court’s discussion
of the President’s constitutional power to veto legislation in the Pocket
Veto Case.166 In that case, the Court found that “[t]he faithful and effective exercise of this momentous duty [to veto legislation] necessarily
requires time in which the President may carefully examine and consider a bill and determine, after due deliberation, whether he should
approve or disapprove it.”167
[I]t is just as essential a part of the constitutional provisions, guarding against
ill-considered and unwise legislation, that the President, on his part, should
have the full time allowed him for determining whether he should approve
or disapprove a bill, and if disapproved, for adequately formulating the objections that should be considered by Congress, as it is that Congress, on its
part, should have an opportunity to re-pass the bill over his objections.168

who deal with the White House on a sensitive basis is an absolute prerequisite to the
effective discharge of the duties of that high office.”).
163. 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974) (emphasis added).
164. Id. at 708.
165. Id. at 705–06.
166. 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
167. Id. at 677 (emphasis added).
168. Id. at 678.
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In short, although the constitutional text does not state explicitly that
the President’s decision to sign a bill or not requires deliberation,169
the Court found that such a decision could only be made “after due
deliberation.”170
6. Trump v. Hawaii
This brings us to the latest example of the Court examining
whether the President satisfactorily exercised power. In Trump v. Hawaii, the Court considered whether President Trump had adequately
made the predicate finding to exercise power in the so-called Travel
Ban that the entry of certain classes of aliens would be “detrimental to
the interests of the United States.”171 In concluding the President had
satisfied his obligation to make the relevant finding, the Court went
out of its way to detail and emphasize the “worldwide, multi-agency
review” that preceded the ban.172 In short, the Court upheld the exercise of power precisely because it believed the President’s claim that
he had gathered relevant information and made a considered judgment based on it.
It is worth quoting the opinion to see how the Court viewed the
President’s exercise of power as lawful precisely because of the deliberation that preceded it:

169. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 7 ( “Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the
President of the United States; if he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return
it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.”).
170. See also Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. at 678 (noting how the President might
need “sufficient time in which to complete his consideration”); La Abra Silver Mining
Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 455 (1899) (noting that time given to the President
after Presentment is “for an examination of its provisions”).
171. Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1182(f)).
172. Id. at 2408 (“The President lawfully exercised [the delegated] discretion
based on his findings—following a worldwide, multi-agency review—that entry of the
covered aliens would be detrimental to the national interest.”). President Trump issued the first version of the Travel Ban in his first week in office, reportedly without
standard interagency review. See W. Neil Eggleston & Amanda Elbogen, The Trump Administration and the Breakdown of Intra-Executive Legal Process, 127 YALE L.J.F. 825,
829–30 (2018). After that order was enjoined by lower courts, the President replaced
it with a new order, which barred entry from six countries for ninety days while a
“worldwide review” would be conducted relating to “the adequacy of information provided by foreign governments about their nationals seeking to enter the United States.”
Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2403–04. After that order was also partially enjoined, the President
“complet[ed] the worldwide review” and issued a third version of the ban, which was
reviewed by the Court. Id. at 2404.
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The sole prerequisite set forth in § 1182(f) is that the President “find[]” that
the entry of the covered aliens “would be detrimental to the interests of the
United States.” The President has undoubtedly fulfilled that requirement
here. He first ordered DHS and other agencies to conduct a comprehensive evaluation of every single country’s compliance with the information and risk assessment baseline. The President then issued a Proclamation setting forth
extensive findings describing how deficiencies in the practices of select foreign governments . . . deprive the Government of “sufficient information to
assess the risks [those countries’ nationals] pose to the United States.” Based
on that review, the President found that it was in the national interest to restrict entry of aliens who could not be vetted with adequate information—
both to protect national security and public safety, and to induce improvement by their home countries. The Proclamation therefore “craft[ed] . . .
country-specific restrictions that would be most likely to encourage cooperation given each country’s distinct circumstances,” while securing the Nation
“until such time as improvements occur.”173

The Court thus upheld the finding because it viewed the President’s
determination as relying on, first, gathering information and, then, issuing an order “based on” and “crafted” in light of the information
found. In other words, the Court viewed the President as having gathered information and made a considered judgment “based on” that information, i.e., that the President had deliberated. Indeed, the Court
went out of its way to emphasize the President’s deliberation by referencing repeatedly that the President had conducted a “worldwide”
interagency review before making the relevant determination.174 In
short, the Court appeared to find the President had validly exercised
the power precisely because the President had done so after gathering
information and making a considered judgment based on it.
Although the Court’s review of the Establishment Clause challenge later in the opinion raises distinct issues from the question of
what the President’s baseline procedural duties are in exercising
power, that part of the opinion repeats some of the standard deference considerations mentioned above. The Court stated: “Because decisions in these matters may . . . involve ‘classifications defined in the
light of changing political and economic circumstances,’ such judgments ‘are frequently of a character more appropriate to either the
Legislature or the Executive,’”175 and “‘when it comes to collecting evidence and drawing inferences’ on questions of national security, ‘the
173. Trump, 138 S. Ct. at 2408–09 (emphasis added) (first quoting 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(f); then quoting Proclamation 9723, 83 Fed. Reg. 15,937 (Apr. 10, 2018)).
174. See, e.g., id. at 2404–05 (“After consulting with multiple Cabinet members and
other officials, the President adopted the Acting Secretary [of Homeland Security’s]
recommendations and issued the Proclamation.”); id. at 2408, 2412, 2417 (emphasizing “the multi-agency review process”).
175. Id. at 2418–19 (emphasis added) (quoting Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81
(1976)).
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lack of competence on the part of the courts is marked.’”176 The Court
further noted: “‘Any rule of constitutional law that would inhibit the
flexibility’ of the President ‘to respond to changing world conditions
should be adopted only with the greatest caution . . .’”177 and that “we
cannot substitute our own assessment for the Executive’s predictive
judgments on such matters, all of which ‘are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.’ . . . [T]he Executive’s evaluation of
the underlying facts is entitled to appropriate weight.”178
Here, once again, the Court envisioned the President as under a
duty to “collect[] evidence and draw[] inferences” before exercising
power.179 Its deference was premised on a view that it needed to give
the President flexibility to “respond” to “changing world conditions”
and to defer to the President’s greater skill in making “predictive judgments” based on an “evaluation of the underlying facts.” These statements would not make sense if the President was not required to
gather information and make a considered judgment based on such
“underlying facts.”
For all its flaws, Trump v. Hawaii reinforces the duty to deliberate
by combining some of the points made above. It approved the President’s exercise of power under a delegation requiring only that he
“find” entry “detrimental to the interests of the United States” as justified precisely because the President engaged in a “worldwide” interagency process of information gathering and internal executive
branch deliberation before making the relevant finding. It then deferred to the President’s substantive decision because it assumed the
President was better positioned to gather the requisite information
and make a considered judgment on it.
7. Sum and Critiques
Canvassing Supreme Court cases assessing the President’s exercise of power reveals that the Court has long viewed the President as
obligated to gather relevant information and make a considered judgment based on it before exercising power delegated directly to her.
One potential counterargument to the identification of this duty
is that these cases merely typify a descriptive assumption about what
the President is likely to do or ought to do, rather than what the
176. Id. at 2419 (emphasis added) (quoting Holder v. Humanitarian L. Project, 561
U.S. 1, 34 (2010)).
177. Id. at 2419–20 (emphasis added) (quoting Mathews, 426 U.S. at 81–82).
178. Id. at 2421–22 (emphasis added) (quoting Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)).
179. Id. at 2419 (quoting Holder, 561 U.S. at 34).
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President must do to exercise power lawfully. In other words, the argument runs that the cases might describe the President’s deliberation as satisfying a condition that is sufficient to lawfully exercise
power but not necessary. In my view, this position is not reconcilable
with these cases for at least three reasons.
First, the nondelegation cases do not operate on the register of
discussing a merely sufficient, rather than necessary, condition. In
many of these cases, the reason the delegations were held constitutional was precisely because the President had to find certain conditions that the Court assumed could only be found upon deliberation.
It seems implausible to read the cases as suggesting that the Court
would have upheld the delegations if the President had argued that he
could or did find these conditions—which again were necessary features of upholding the delegations—satisfied arbitrarily, without
gathering any information or making a considered judgment.180 In
other words, the President’s deliberation in finding the condition was
a necessary feature of upholding the delegations—if the President
could find the conditions arbitrarily, the conditions that made the legislation constitutional would not actually limit the delegation at all
and the delegations would have been held to be unconstitutional.
Second, the remaining areas of doctrine primarily include deference and privilege doctrines that exist precisely because the Court believed the President must deliberate in order to validly exercise power
and that such deliberation must be protected. These deference and
privilege doctrines presuppose that the President will engage in deliberation before exercising a power granted to her by statute or the
Constitution. For example, the national security deference and presumption of regularity doctrines’ raison d’etre is the belief that the
President has superior ability to gather information and make a
180. Cf. Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 439 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting)
(“Either the statute means that the President is to adhere to the declared policy of Congress, or it means that he is to exercise a merely arbitrary will. The one construction
invigorates the act; the other saps its life. A choice between them is not hard.”); id. at
448 (“If legislative power is delegated subject to a condition, it is a requirement of constitutional government that the condition be fulfilled. In default of such fulfillment,
there is in truth no delegation, and hence no official action, but only the vain show of
it.”). After all, concluding that the President can find these conditions arbitrarily would
effectively be a finding that there are no such conditions. Cf. JAFFE, supra note 33, at
595 (“The ‘law’ does not operate in a vacuum. The application of law requires a factual
predicate; an action without such a predicate is lawless. A finding of fact which is based
on no more than the will or desire of the administrator is lawless in substance if not in
form.”); see also Steilen, supra note 32, at 513 (“If there is no power in government to
act arbitrarily, then there can be no authority in the legislature to delegate arbitrary
power.”).
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considered judgment based on it that courts cannot competently evaluate. Such deference or presumptions naturally would not apply if the
President had conceded that he had not gathered any information or
made any considered judgment before exercising the relevant power.
If that were so, the Court could easily evaluate the exercise of power—
the President’s institutional advantages would be absent and there
would be no need for such deference doctrines. Similarly, the purpose
of executive privilege is to protect the President’s ability to deliberate.181 If the President conceded no deliberation had occurred—that
he did not, in fact, gather any information or that he did not make a
considered judgment at all—the privilege would not attach.182 There
would be no information to protect.
Even beyond a lack of deliberation eliminating application of
these doctrines in any particular instance, the very existence of these
deference and privilege doctrines supports the notion that the President must deliberate before exercising power delegated to her. Again,
this is the presupposition for why these doctrines are seen as necessary. It seems unlikely that the Court would have created these deference and privilege doctrines to protect presidential deliberation if it
viewed such deliberation as a laudatory but ultimately optional feature of presidential decisionmaking, rather than a necessary one.183 It
is true these cases do not explicitly address—likely because no one
would have thought to argue—whether the President can exercise
power without deliberating at all, but it seems hard to believe the
Court would have crafted these doctrines in the way it did if the President could exercise power without engaging in any deliberation.
Finally, at a bare minimum, the cases discussed above show that
in a wide range of cases the Court has made a descriptive assumption
about how the President exercises power—that before doing so she
deliberates by gathering relevant information and then makes a considered judgment based on that information. To conclude that the
President has no duty to deliberate is not only to find that this descriptive assumption was wrong, but also that it was irrelevant to the outcome of all these cases. That seems much less likely than the alternative. It is true that one can never truly know what the Court would
181. See supra notes 157–58 and accompanying text.
182. The privilege might attach outside of the deliberative process if there were
some law enforcement, attorney-client communication, or perhaps classified information present. But if there is no information gathering or considered judgment, it is
unlikely it could contain attorney-client communication or classified information.
183. And, indeed, in the privilege context, the Court repeatedly described such deliberation as necessary to exercise the powers given to the President, rather than
merely normatively desirable. See, e.g., supra note 163 and accompanying text.
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have done if the President had told the Court that this assumption was
false—that, in fact, the President could and did find the relevant conditions rendering the delegations constitutional without any deliberation at all; that deference was required even though the President’s
national security decisions need not be and were not based on any information or consideration at all; that regularity should be presumed
even though there was no regular process; that the President has constitutional authority to withhold information even though divulging it
would not reveal any deliberation; that the President’s finding that the
entry of certain classes of aliens would be “detrimental to the interests
of the United States” was lawfully made on a whim with no information at all, let alone following a “worldwide, multi-agency review.”
But it seems far more likely that if the Court discovered that this assumption was false, this discovery would have mattered to the outcomes of the cases rather than it being irrelevant. In other words, the
assumption seems like more than mere window-dressing in the opinions irrelevant to the Court’s ultimate decision.
It is much more straightforward to believe that the Court’s consistent belief about how the President operated, present across a
range of cases spanning more than a century, reflected how it thought
the President must act to exercise power lawfully—i.e., that the President must deliberate before exercising power. The fact that the Court
never spelled this out explicitly is likely reflective of the fact that no
one would have thought to argue that the President could simply exercise these powers arbitrarily, rather than that such arbitrary exercises of power are permissible.
Although the Court has not yet made the duty to deliberate explicit or shown itself willing to robustly police the President’s compliance with it, the best reading of its cases shows that the Court has long
assumed the President is obligated to gather relevant information and
make a considered judgment on that information before exercising
power. The President must deliberate before exercising power.
C. EXECUTIVE BRANCH INTERPRETATION
A duty to gather information and make a considered judgment
based upon such information is perhaps even more obviously present
in executive branch legal advice dating to the early days of the Republic. This Section looks to the history of Attorney General and modern
Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) opinions to evaluate how they have construed the President’s procedural duties in exercising power. It turns
out that a long history of Attorney General and OLC opinions supports
the notion that when the President is delegated power contingent on
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making some sort of factual or policy determination, she has a duty to
gather information and make a considered judgment based on that information in making the determination.
Of course, such executive branch practice is not conclusive of constitutionality.184 But given that the President’s legal advisers have historically been protective of presidential power and wary of imposing
burdens on it, if they have assumed the President is under a duty to
deliberate, then we ought not to lightly disregard such an assumption.
In addition, establishing the long pedigree of this duty might assuage
concerns that identifying the duty now would be novel and overly burdensome. To the contrary, such a duty seems to have been accepted
since at least the early nineteenth century.
For example, in 1823, the Attorney General advised the President
that if an official under the President’s command had made a “corrupt
appointment,” the President would be “constitutionally bound to look
to the case” in order to abide by the duty to “take care that the laws be
faithfully executed,” and, if corruption had taken place, to punish the
official for the violation.185 An 1831 opinion on the Jewels of the Princess of Orange made an analogous point stating the President had a
duty to look into potential malfeasance by his subordinates and, if
found, take action to correct it.186 In both instances, the Attorney General presumed a duty to gather relevant information and make a considered judgment upon it.187
In 1853, the Attorney General advised the President that before
granting a pardon to someone prior to conviction, “there must be satisfactory evidence of some kind as to the guilt of the party,” again suggesting the President had to gather information—i.e., “satisfactory evidence”—and act upon it.188 And, in 1857, the Attorney General
184. See generally Shalev Roisman, Constitutional Acquiescence, 84 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 668 (2016) (cautioning against assuming that because a branch has acted a certain way that it has done so because it viewed such action as constitutional); Curtis A.
Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV.
L. REV. 411 (2012).
185. President & Acct. Officers, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 624, 626 (1823).
186. Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 489 (1831) (“[U]pon
the President being satisfied that the forms of law were abused for such a purpose, and
being bound to take care that the law was faithfully executed, it would become his duty
to take measures to correct the procedure.”).
187. See Death Warrants, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 344, 344–45 (1830) (noting that decision
to leave execution of sentences to courts was made by the President “after mature deliberation”).
188. Pardoning Power of the President, 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 21 (1853) (stating that
prosecutor should “be required to communicate any facts, which . . . may contribute to
inform the conscience of the President in the premises”); see also Off. & Duties of Att’y
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described the President’s role in appointing someone to a particular
office,
[T]he fitness or unfitness of persons for a particular appointment to office . . .
depends, or can or may depend, on a mass of facts, covering more or less of
time, and constituting the history of the person. These facts it is the duty of
the President, in all cases of nomination to office, to determine as he best may,
by personal or by communicated knowledge.189

The Attorney General thus clearly conceived of the President as having a duty to gather information and make a considered judgment
based upon it in order to exercise the President’s appointment authority.
In keeping with this conception, in 1856, the Attorney General
concluded the President could not send federal military aid to the governor of California to suppress an insurrection because the statute
permitting such aid was limited to instances where the state legislature could not be convened, which was not the case then.190 In doing
so, the Attorney General noted “[i]t is obvious that the President of the
United States must himself determine the conditions of actual or apprehended insurrection in a State, demanding and justifying the interposition of the military force of the United States.”191 Again, here, the
Attorney General viewed the President as bound to gather relevant
information and make a considered judgment based on such information before exercising power.
A few years later, in 1860, the Attorney General again assumed
the President had to gather information and make a considered judgment before invoking statutory power in concluding that before the
President could call forth the militia pursuant to a finding that the
laws of the United States could not be enforced by ordinary judicial
proceedings, their “incapacity to cope with the power opposed to
them shall be plainly demonstrated,” stating that “[i]t is only upon
clear evidence to that effect that a military force can be called into the
field.”192

Gen., 6 Op. Att’y Gen. 326, 350 (1854) (“The conscientious determination of [whether
to grant pardons] requires, generally, the investigation of proceedings in court, and
that of questions of law as well as of evidence . . . .”).
189. Navy Efficiency Acts, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 335, 351 (1857) (emphasis added).
190. Insurrection in a State, 8 Op. Att’y Gen. 8, 13 (1856).
191. Id. at 15; see also id. (“[W]ithout presuming to say that there may not be in the
present case some act of moral authority competent for you in your discretion to perform, still, in my opinion, the circumstances do not afford sufficient legal justification
for acceding to the actual requests of the Governor of the State of California.”).
192. Power of the President in Executing the L., 9 Op. Att’y Gen. 516, 522 (1860).
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Similarly, in 1874, when two people claiming to be governor of
Arkansas asked the President for federal assistance to combat “domestic Violence” pursuant to the Guarantee Clause,193 the Attorney
General stated that “where two persons, each claiming to be governor,
make calls respectively upon the President, under said clause of the
Constitution, it of course becomes necessary for him to determine in
the first place which of said persons is the constitutional governor of
the State.”194 The Attorney General thus envisioned the President as
gathering relevant information about who was the rightful governor
and making a considered judgment upon that information before exercising power.
In 1881, the Attorney General opined on a presidential authority
permitting the President to “drop from the rolls of the Army, for desertion, any officer who is now . . . absent from duty three months
without leave.”195 “To exercise such power,” the Attorney General
stated,
the President must necessarily first ascertain to his own satisfaction what officers are “now” so absent. . . . The law placed its ascertainment wholly in the
hands of the Chief Executive, who must naturally have been expected to resort to the official records of the War Department as one source, at least, of
information.196

Again the Attorney General believed the President had a duty to
gather information, here, to conduct an investigation into military records, and make a considered judgment based on such investigation
before making the relevant determination.
Similarly, in an 1892 opinion regarding the President’s authority
to award medals of honor to officers and privates who “have most distinguished . . . themselves in action” the Attorney General noted that
Congress “proceeded on the idea that the evidence which would
chiefly, if not exclusively, guide the judgment of the President in
awarding ‘medals of honor’ would be the official reports of battles
made to the War Department.”197 Again, the premise was that the
193. See U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to every State in
this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.”).
194. Governorship of Ark.—Case of Baxter & Brooks, 14 Op. Att’y Gen. 391, 394
(1874).
195. Case of Walker A. Newton, 17 Op. Att’y Gen. 13, 15 (1881) (emphasis omitted).
196. Id. (emphasis added); see also id. at 18 (“It was left to the President to ascertain and determine who ought to be dropped, and then to govern himself accordingly. . . . [T]he means of discovering the facts was left to the sound judgment of him
upon whom was conferred the power to act.”).
197. Medal of Honor, 20 Op. Att’y Gen. 421, 421–22 (1892).
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President would gather information and act based on the evidence he
found.
In an opinion in 1910, the Attorney General stated that before the
President could determine that a foreign country had “unduly discriminate[d] against the United States,” thereby triggering authority to impose a tariff regime,
Clearly . . . the President should consider not only [the intricate provisions of
the relevant German law,] but also their bearing upon the commercial conditions existing between the citizens of this country and the owners of potash
mines in Germany, and ascertain therefrom whether this provision of the
German law must and does in fact work a discrimination against the United
States.198

The Attorney General added that in making the determination the
“President should consider all the attendant facts and circumstances.”199 Again, the Attorney General assumed the President had a
duty to gather and consider relevant information before making the
determination. This view was supported by numerous other opinions
of that era.200
And this view persisted. In 1964, after calls by civil rights groups
and members of Congress to use federal personnel to prevent further
violence against civil rights workers in Mississippi, Deputy Attorney
General Nicolas Katzenbach addressed whether the President had
statutory authority to use military force premised on making a determination that doing so was necessary to enforce federal law.201 Katzenbach concluded that although “[t]here is, of course, considerable
information available that could be used to support” the claim that
there had been a complete breakdown of state law enforcement as a
result of Klan activity in Mississippi, “in view of the extreme seriousness of the use of those [authorities], . . . the government should have
more evidence than it presently has of the inability of state and local
198. Potash Mined in Ger.—Antitrust L.—Discriminatory Exp. Duty, 31 Op. Att’y
Gen. 545, 556–57 (1910) (emphasis added).
199. Id. at 546.
200. See, e.g., Tariff Comm’n—Investigation in Respect to Duty on Logs of Fir,
Spruce, Etc., 34 Op. Att’y Gen. 77, 80 (1924) (“As to such importations, therefore, it is
not only within the power but it becomes the duty of the President to ascertain
whether there is any difference between the foreign and domestic cost of production
which may not be equalized by the duty as fixed.”); Spanish Ry. Concessions—Phil., 23
Op. Att’y Gen. 181, 195 (1900) (“[T]he President has authority, if he thinks it necessary,
to apply the local revenues of the provinces through which this road extends to the
discharge of their equitable liability, based upon so much of the concessionary agreement as has been already executed, the amount of which liability he has authority to
determine, in view of all the facts and circumstances.” (emphasis added)).
201. See Use of Marshals, Troops, & Other Fed. Pers. for L. Enf’t in Miss., 1 Supp. Op.
O.L.C. 493, 493 (1964).
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officials to maintain law and order—as a matter of wisdom as well as
of law.”202 Katzenbach thus suggested the President had a duty to
gather information—indeed more information than the President
possessed—and make a considered judgment on it before making the
relevant determination.
More recent opinions by the Office of Legal Counsel also support
this duty. Like the Supreme Court, OLC has recognized a constitutionally based executive privilege doctrine, based on the idea that the confidentiality the privilege provides “protects . . . the candid advice that
the Supreme Court has acknowledged is essential to presidential decision-making,” and without which “a President could not expect to
receive the full and frank submissions of facts and opinions upon
which effective discharge of his duties depends.”203
The duty is present in numerous other contexts as well. For example, in discussing the President’s voluminous powers upon declaring a “severe energy supply interruption,” OLC stated that “the available statutory authorities generally provide the President with broad
discretion to determine if, when, and how they should be exercised,
taking into account the facts of any future energy emergency and the
President’s best judgment as to how to prevent or deal with the emergency situation.”204 Again, OLC assumed the President’s determination would be based on the “facts” of the relevant emergency and the
President’s “best judgment” as to how to deal with it.205
In 1995, OLC considered whether the President had a duty to impose sanctions on certain individuals upon finding they had “knowingly and materially contributed” to a chemical weapons program of

202. Id. at 498.
203. Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns. to the President,
2019 WL 2315338, at *2 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019); Immunity of the Assistant to the President & Dir. of the Off. of Pol. Strategy & Outreach from Cong. Subpoena, 2014 WL
10788678, at *3 (O.L.C. July 15, 2014) (“[E]xecutive branch confidentiality . . . is necessary (among other things) to ensure that the President can obtain the type of sound
and candid advice that is essential to the effective discharge of his constitutional duties.”).
204. Legal Auths. Available to the President To Respond to a Severe Energy Supply
Interruption or Other Substantial Reduction in Available Petrol. Prods., 6 Op. O.L.C.
644, 649 (1982).
205. See also Cong. Disapproval of AWACS Arms Sale, 5 Op. O.L.C. 308, 316–17
(1981) (holding the President could “initiate procedures under the emergency exception to the congressional review provision . . . if in his considered discretion such a judgment is possible” (emphasis added)).
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certain countries.206 OLC concluded “the President has a duty to make
the determinations specified in the statute if he is presented with sufficient evidence to compel [the relevant] conclusion.”207 Here, OLC
cast the President in the role envisioned by J.W. Hampton, one of the
nondelegation cases mentioned above:
When [Congress] delegates the power, and prescribes the duty, to make . . .
determinations [of when a triggering condition has been satisfied], the President may be considered “the mere agent of the law-making department to
ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take
effect.” We believe that [the relevant section] casts the President in such a
role, and requires him to make a determination if the facts available to him
establish that the conditions described in the statute exist.208

Again, OLC conceived of the President as bound to make the relevant
determination based on the evidence before him—he had to deliberate before exercising power.
Most recently, even the extremely executive-power friendly OLC
under the Trump administration has supported the duty to gather information and make a considered judgment upon it. For example, with
respect to the President’s use of military force in Syria, OLC stated
“[w]e would not expect that any President would use [the] power [of
the armed forces] without a substantial basis for believing that a proposed operation is necessary to advance important interests of the
Nation.”209 And, regarding releasing records relating to John F. Kennedy’s assassination, OLC noted that, if the President did not make
group-level decisions about what should be released, he “would be
forced to evaluate the individual justifications for postponing tens of
thousands of records on a compressed timetable without adequate
time for full consideration,” again suggesting that the President has a
duty to gather and make a considered judgment before exercising
power.210 Even OLC’s opinion concluding that the Secretary of Treasury need not hand over President Trump’s tax returns despite a statutory requirement that such returns “shall [be] furnish[ed]” upon request by the House Ways and Means Committee Chair arguably

206. See Presidential Discretion To Delay Making Determinations Under the Chem.
& Biological Weapons Control & Warfare Elimination Act of 1991, 19 Op. O.L.C. 306,
306–07 (1995).
207. Id. at 310.
208. Id. at 309 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411
(1928)).
209. Apr. 2018 Airstrikes Against Syrian Chem.-Weapons Facilities, 2018 WL
2760027, at *7 (O.L.C. May 31, 2018).
210. Temp. Certification Under the President John F. Kennedy Assassination Recs.
Collection Act of 1992, 2017 WL 9868940, at *6 (O.L.C. Oct. 26, 2017).
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supports the duty.211 In concluding that Treasury had authority to disregard the request because of the House’s purported illegitimate legislative motive, OLC found that the Take Care Clause imposed a duty
that “Treasury must determine, for itself, whether the Committee’s
stated reason reflects its true one or is merely a pretext.”212 Here, OLC
was identifying a duty stemming from the Take Care Clause to make a
considered judgment based on available information gathered by the
executive.
In short, a long history of internal executive branch legal advice
suggests the President has a duty to gather relevant information and
make a considered judgment based on it before making predicate determinations that give the President power.
D. DOES THE DUTY APPLY TO CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITIES?
The duty established above clearly applies to the President’s exercise of statutory powers, but what about powers originating in the
President’s constitutional authorities? Although some of the cases discussed above—particularly those involving the nondelegation doctrine—dealt with statutory authority, there is good reason to think the
duty applies to constitutional authorities as well. First, if we take the
term “Laws” in the Take Care Clause to include constitutional authorities—as it is typically, although not universally, understood—then
the duty to be conscientious and execute the law without failure of
performance applies to constitutional authorities.213 And, in terms of
Supreme Court precedent outside of the nondelegation space, although many of the cases discussed above related to statutory authorities, not all did. For example, the executive privilege cases are premised on the need for deliberation not only for statutory powers but
also for constitutional ones, which is something that Justice Rehnquist
took pains to emphasize.214 The Court’s discussion of the President’s
211. Cong. Comm.’s Request for the President’s Tax Returns Under 26 U.S.C.
§ 6103(f), 2019 WL 2563046, at *1, *22 (O.L.C. June 13, 2019).
212. Id. at *26.
213. See, e.g., Bernick, supra note 18, at 33 (concluding “Laws” includes the Constitution); cf. Goldsmith & Manning, supra note 116, at 1855 (acknowledging debate over
whether “Laws” includes the Constitution); Roisman, supra note 18, at 855 (same).
214. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 558 (1977) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (opining that the Act would “significantly hamper[] the President . . . in his ability
to gather the necessary information to perform the countless discrete acts which are
the prerogative of his office under Art. II of the Constitution”); id. at 551–52 (“Given
the vast spectrum of the decisions that confront him—domestic affairs, relationships
with foreign powers, direction of the military as Commander in Chief—it is by no
means an overstatement to conclude that current, accurate, and absolutely candid
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veto power as requiring “due deliberation” also applied to a constitutional, rather than statutory, power.215 Similarly, deference to the
President based on the ability to gather information and evaluate it
applies to constitutional powers as well.216 And, the logic of the presumption of regularity cases would not seem to be limited to findings
required by statute rather than those required by the Constitution.217
Finally, the internal executive branch legal opinions discussed
above frequently assumed the duty of deliberation applied to constitutional powers, not just statutory ones.218 In short, the duty to deliberate does not seem specific to executing statutory powers, but it also
appears to encompass exercising constitutional powers.
E. WHAT DOES THE DUTY ENTAIL?
Before explaining how the duty might best be enforced, it is
worth addressing briefly what the duty to deliberate might entail in
concrete terms. First, it is important to recognize that the duty is a
standard. The duty to deliberate requires that if a power is contingent
on finding a certain condition, the President must find that condition
following reasonable deliberation—she must gather relevant information and make a considered judgment based on it. The amount of
deliberation required will vary depending on the relevant authority.
In theory, the information that is relevant could be very little, gathering it could simply require recalling it to mind, and making a considered judgment might require simply thinking it through. But, in many
cases, much more deliberation will be required to be able to say that
the President has gathered the relevant information and made a considered judgment.
information is essential to the proper performance of his office.”).
215. See Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655, 677–78 (1929).
216. Cf. Chi. & S. Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948)
(discussing need for secrecy for President “both as Commander-in-Chief and as the
Nation’s organ for foreign affairs”); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S.
304, 319–21 (1936) (discussing President’s constitutional foreign affairs authorities).
217. See Roisman, supra note 18, at 834–37 (listing constitutional authorities requiring factual findings).
218. See, e.g., Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Op. Att’y Gen. 482, 489 (1831)
(regarding Take Care Clause obligations); Pardoning Power of the President, 6 Op.
Att’y Gen. 20, 21 (1853) (regarding the pardon power); Governorship of Ark., 14 Op.
Att’y Gen. 391, 393–94 (1874) (regarding the Guarantee Clause); Recess Appointments, 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 25 (1921) (regarding recess appointments); Authorization
To Use Mil. Force in Libya, 2011 WL 1459998, at *1 (O.L.C. Apr. 1, 2011) (regarding
constitutional use of force); Testimonial Immunity Before Cong. of the Former Couns.
to the President, 2019 WL 2315338, at *2 (O.L.C. May 20, 2019) (regarding executive
privilege).
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The concrete requirements of the duty will depend on the particular authority at issue. For example, imagine the President were delegated the power to open to the public certain parks around the White
House when “the weather outside is conducive to the parks’ enjoyment.” Exercising such power is not purely discretionary—the President has to find the weather is a certain way, thus the power is conditional and deliberation is required. But the deliberation could be
relatively minimal. She could simply step outside and see what the
weather was (i.e., gather information) and then consider that information in making the relevant judgment. Making this determination
would not require full interagency review or anything of the sort.
On the other hand, if the President is delegated authority to lift
bans on importing cattle only when such importation can be done
“without danger of the introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease,”219 then the duty to deliberate would require more fact
gathering. The President cannot make this decision without gathering
relevant information about what infectious diseases are out there,
how likely they are to be introduced or spread if cattle are imported,
and so on. To get this information, the President cannot just call it to
mind.220 Instead, the President would have to ask people, presumably
within her administration,221 for the relevant information. After gathering this information, the President would then have to consider
whether, given the information she has received, importing cattle
could be done “without danger of the introduction or spread of contagious or infectious disease.”222
There are various authorities contingent on the President making
relatively vague findings that a particular action is, for example, in the
“national interest,”223 “national security interest,”224 or “national
219. See Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 688 (1892) (quoting Act of Mar.
6, 1866, 14 Stat. 3, 4).
220. Or at least no modern President would have had this information at hand
without having to engage in fact-gathering.
221. Conceivably she could ask people outside her administration as well. The
point is she has to gather information and consider it before exercising the power.
222. See Marshall Field & Co., 143 U.S. at 688.
223. See 7 U.S.C. § 1728a(a) (permitting the delivery of foreign aid if in the “national interest”); 10 U.S.C. § 152 (waiving restrictions on appointing officers if “necessary in the national interest”); 30 U.S.C. § 1412(c)(5) (limiting hard mineral resources
processing unless “such restrictions contravene the overriding national interests of the
United States”).
224. See 10 U.S.C. § 12305(a) (empowering the President to suspend “any provision of law relating to promotion, retirement, or separation applicable to any member
of the armed forces who the President determines is essential to the national security
of the United States”); 22 U.S.C. § 9524(c) (stating that the President can waive Russian
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defense interest of the United States,”225 or that exempting certain
governmental conduct from regulations will be in the “paramount interest of the United States.”226 These are of course relatively broad
findings but would still require the President to deliberate. She would
have to find out what the likely effect of taking the relevant action
would be—i.e., gather information—and then consider whether the
effect would be in the relevant “national security,” “national defense,”
or “paramount interest of the United States.”227 Often, she will not already know what the likely effect would be and thus some consultation with other actors—again presumably within the executive
branch—would be required to satisfy the duty to deliberate.
In short, the power at issue and the type of condition the President must find, combined with her preexisting knowledge, will help
determine what the duty requires. Some exercises of power might require relatively little in the way of deliberative process and others
would require much more. Like many procedural obligations, the duty
is a standard that develops specific meaning when applied to concrete
cases.
III. ENFORCING THE PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO DELIBERATE
Even if we accept that the President has a duty to deliberate, the
question remains how such a duty might best be enforced. Such enforcement could be done through different forms of judicial review,
internal executive branch constraints, or congressional regulation.
This Part takes these three options in turn.
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW
Once we identify the President’s positive procedural obligations,
understanding how courts can enforce them becomes relatively
sanctions if “in the vital national security interests”); Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-45, § 7, 109 Stat. 398, 400 (empowering the President to suspend requirements related to moving U.S. Embassy to Jerusalem if doing so “is necessary to
protect the national security interests of the United States”).
225. See 50 U.S.C. § 98f(a) (authorizing release of materials from stockpile if “required for . . . the national defense”); id. § 4533 (granting authority to contract for certain industrial resources if material is “essential to the national defense”).
226. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4903(b)(2), 6991f(a), 6961(a) (providing for exemptions to
federal law if the President determines something is in the “paramount interest of the
United States”).
227. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 848–49 (“Common statutory requirements that the President find that certain conduct is in the ‘national interest,’ ‘paramount interest of the United States,’ ‘national security interest,’ or ‘national defense’
interest . . . require policy judgment, [but] the judgment is based on a set of facts.”).
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straightforward. If the President has a duty to gather relevant information and make a considered judgment, then courts can require the
President to show she has done so, i.e., that she has in fact gathered
relevant information and made a considered judgment informed by
such information. If the President has not engaged in such deliberation, the President would then need to explain why exigencies justifiably prevented such deliberation. The way courts could enforce the
duty is thus a straightforward version of a procedural review requiring the President to establish she has deliberated.
Approaching the question of judicial review from this vantage
point might provide something of a starting position for ongoing debates over the optimal form of judicial review of presidential orders.
The current debate relating to judicial review of presidential orders
spans a range of views. Evan Bernick, David Driesen, and Kathryn Kovacs have all recently suggested that courts ought to apply some variant of administrative law’s arbitrary and capricious review to presidential orders.228 These accounts would thus require the President to
engage in record-keeping and at least some technocratic justification.229 Almost forty years ago, Harold Bruff suggested a heightened
form of “rational basis” review typically applicable to legislation,
where courts might require the President to include affidavits and in
camera proceedings, along with an explanation requirement.230 Meanwhile, Lisa Manheim and Kathryn Watts caution against “borrowing
too reflexively” from either administrative law or statutory review regimes.231 For their part, they propose a form of a reason-giving review
228. See, e.g., Driesen, supra note 19, at 1044–50; see also Kathryn Kovacs, Trump
v. Hawaii: A Run of the Mill Administrative Law Case, YALE J. ON REGUL.: NOTICE & COMMENT (May 3, 2018), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/trump-v-hawaii-a-run-of-the-mill
-administrative-law-case-by-kathryn-e-kovacs [https://perma.cc/X2F5-CLBK] (arguing that APA’s arbitrary and capricious review should apply to presidential orders);
Bernick, supra note 18, at 7, 66 (arguing for “modified version of hard-look arbitrary
and capricious review”).
229. See, e.g., Bernick, supra note 18, at 55 (“The President must compile a record
in which he identifies some ‘facts and conditions’ that support his decision, and those
facts and conditions must be sufficiently related to the statutory framework that he is
executing as to warrant confidence that he is not acting opportunistically.”).
230. See Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68
VA. L. REV. 1, 57–58 (1982) (“If no formal explanation accompanies a presidential decision, a court can require affidavits describing the rationale and can check their veracity
through in camera procedures.”); id. at 59–60 (suggesting an “explanation requirement”).
231. See Manheim & Watts, supra note 19, at 1812, 1814 (“[W]e do not believe that
it would be advisable for the courts to blindly transfer either administrative law’s
many complex deference doctrines or the legislative arena’s highly deferential rationality review into the presidential-order context. Instead, we believe that an
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that would require the President to “set forth a nonarbitrary justification in the text of her orders themselves,” which the court would defer
to “so long as the decisional factors that the president relied upon
were not legally foreclosed by [] statute[] or the Constitution, and so
long as any factual justifications had adequate support.”232
All of these suggestions have potential normative appeal. The
“hard look” approach might be attractive to those who find additional
judicial review and constraint of presidential orders appealing. Bruff’s
and Manheim and Watts’s approach would require more of presidential orders than is required today but seeks to be less costly than these
versions of hard look review.233 But while these accounts are undoubtedly valuable and important, the existing debate over which
form of judicial review is optimal seems intractable without resort to
extremely hard-to-assess normative intuitions or empirical predictions.234
This Article approaches the question of what form of judicial review is appropriate in a different way than many of these accounts.
Rather than focusing first on how courts ought to review presidential
orders, it first seeks to identify the President’s positive baseline obligations in exercising power and, only after doing so, derive the appropriate form of judicial review from there.235 So if the President’s procedural obligations require her to deliberate, then courts can review
intermediate approach ultimately might make the most sense—one that neither rubber-stamps presidential orders nor intrudes too severely into the president’s policymaking sphere.”).
232. Id. at 1814–15.
233. See id. at 1813 (“It would be difficult for the courts to apply a robust form of
arbitrary and capricious review (akin to hard look review) to presidential orders without also effectively demanding more of the presidents who are issuing those orders:
perhaps technocratic justifications, detailed records, or more.”).
234. That said, if the Supreme Court were to overturn Franklin v. Massachusetts
and hold that the APA in fact does apply to the President, as Kathryn Kovacs has suggested, then hard look review would be required by positive law and the debate would
largely be resolved. See generally Kovacs, supra note 5.
235. Bernick also first identifies the President’s first-order obligations—in his
case, based on an originalist account—before deriving the form of judicial review. See
generally Bernick, supra note 18. However, as Bernick notes, his hard look review approach is inconsistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. See, e.g., id. at 66 (“[C]ertain moves that the majority made in Trump v. Hawaii . . . would have been foreclosed
by the faithful execution framework.”). And, of course, as noted above, if Kovacs’s view
is vindicated that the APA applies to the President, that would resolve many of the
questions relating to the President’s first-order obligations, at least as they apply to
statutory delegations. See Kovacs, supra note 5, at 82–97. Driesen admirably ties his
proposed form of review to certain Supreme Court cases, but, in my view, these cases
are not sufficient to establish the variant of “hard look review” he proposes. See infra
note 236.
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whether she has satisfied that obligation by conducting straightforward procedural review of whether she has gathered relevant information and made a considered judgment informed by such evidence
before exercising power.
The hope of this approach is to perhaps provide a starting point
for existing normative debates by tying the form of judicial review directly to the President’s existing positive legal obligations. This does
not answer the normative question of what form of judicial review is
optimal, but perhaps it can serve as a baseline form of review minimally necessary to enforce the President’s existing procedural duties.236
Some might respond that such bare procedural review will be
toothless. But while such review is not as robust as more searching
procedural or substantive review, it is not meaningless. It would prevent exercises of presidential power that were conducted purely arbitrarily—without deliberation—such as the first version of the Travel
Ban and the transgender military ban.237 And although requiring mere
deliberation might not stop a President dead-set on a certain result, it
often will have consequential effects on the world. For example, the
list of countries in the third version of the Travel Ban—after the directive had gone through more interagency deliberative process—differed from the list in the first version.238 This was of course enormously impactful for citizens of the countries taken off or added to the
list. In short, interagency process and deliberation are often consequential, even in instances where they do not change the bottom-line
policy.239 Indeed, if requiring interagency deliberation were not
236. Driesen acknowledges that some aspects of arbitrary and capricious review
“may not be needed when the President consults widely,” Driesen, supra note 19, at
1048, suggesting that some of the underlying normative concerns behind such review
might be met by deliberation review suggested here.
237. See, e.g., Eggleston & Elbogen, supra note 172, at 829–31 (discussing the injunction issued against the first version of the Travel Ban); id. at 831–33 (“The President announced the [transgender military ban] policy on Twitter without subjecting it
to any intra-executive review beforehand.”); Stone v. Trump, 280 F. Supp. 3d 747, 768
(D. Md. 2017) (“[T]he Presidential Memorandum [did not] identify any policymaking
process or evidence demonstrating that the revocation of transgender rights was necessary for any legitimate national interest.”).
238. The first version of the Travel Ban barred entry by nationals of Iran, Iraq,
Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. See Exec. Order No. 13,769, 82 Fed. Reg. 8977
(Jan. 27, 2017). The second version removed Iraq from this list, barring nationals from
Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen. See Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg.
13,209 (Mar. 6, 2017). The third version added Chad and Venezuela to this list. See
Proclamation No. 9645, 82 Fed. Reg. 45,161 (Sept. 24, 2017).
239. See, e.g., Steilen, supra note 32, at 507–08 (“A statutory regime mandating interagency review prior to such a declaration . . . would subject ‘fabricated or

1324

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[105:1269

impactful in any way, it is unlikely presidents would have instituted
and continued to adhere to a general practice of engaging in such deliberation.240 It is worth acknowledging that allegations of discriminatory intent might well warrant stricter scrutiny, just as they do when
reviewing exercises of other governmental power. The purpose of this
Section is to identify the form of review appropriate for ensuring the
President abides by her baseline procedural obligations—questions
of discriminatory animus raise distinct issues that will have to be addressed separately.
Even if one accepts that this form of review matches well with the
President’s positive obligations and that it would not be meaningless,
one might still think presidents should have to do more to exercise
power than simply consult internally and make a considered judgment. But that is a critique of what the positive law currently is. To
establish that courts must require more than such deliberation, one
needs to provide some basis for believing more robust requirements
are required by positive law, and that case has not been adequately
made.241 To the contrary, a more searching form of judicial review
exaggerated’ claims about the scope of a problem to professional scrutiny. Even if it
did not prevent manufactured declarations of emergency, such a process might shape
the emergency response to answer actual public-policy problems.”); Gideon Rose, How
Can the U.S. Fix Its Foreign Policy?, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2020), https://www.nytimes
.com/2020/06/17/books/review/exercise-of-power-robert-m-gates.html [https://
perma.cc/88GY-ZQUA] (reviewing ROBERT M. GATES, EXERCISE OF POWER: AMERICAN FAILURES, SUCCESSES, AND A NEW PATH FORWARD IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD (2020)) (“Good
process improves the chances of good outcomes and reduces unforced errors—which
are depressingly common at every level.”); cf. Linde, supra note 22, at 253 (“The design
does not presuppose philosopher kings elected by philosopher constituents, free from
ignorance, sloth, gluttony, avarice, short-sightedness, political cowardice and ambition; quite the contrary. It undertakes to confine political irrationality by process, not
what Learned Hand called ‘moral adjurations.’”). Of course, this is not to say that the
consequences of such deliberation will always be good.
240. See, e.g., Renan, supra note 19, at 2221–30 (documenting such practice);
Grove, supra note 121, at 900–10 (same).
241. This would be different if the Supreme Court accepted Kovacs’s argument that
Franklin v. Massachusetts should be overruled. See generally Kovacs, supra note 5. David Driesen’s recent work identifies some existing Supreme Court precedent in support of his argument that courts ought to apply arbitrary and capricious review to
presidential orders. See Driesen, supra note 19, at 1019–22 (first citing Pan. Refin. Co.
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); then citing Highland v. Russell Car & Snow Plow Co., 279
U.S. 253 (1929); and then citing Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932)). But, even
if these cases did suggest some form of “arbitrary and capricious” review is permitted,
other precedents, including the Court’s recent decision in Trump v. Hawaii, suggest that
such review is not required as a matter of positive law. See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138
S. Ct. 2392, 2409 (2018) (characterizing as “questionable” the proposition that President has to explain his “finding with sufficient detail to enable judicial review”); see
also infra note 242.
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would be very hard to square with the existing Supreme Court precedent reviewing presidential orders.242
Apart from such judicial review not being supported by positive
law, we also would have to grapple with the normative costs of such
review. There are serious—albeit not a priori decisive—reasons why
we may not wish that courts second-guess the President’s substantive
decisions in this way. Moreover, it may not be valuable to require the
President to engage in technocratic justification for her decisions in
the way agencies do—at least in all situations. The President is, after
all, not a technocrat. But this gets into complex questions about the
level of procedural obligations we might normatively desire for the
President, which Part IV takes on directly. In short, there might be
good normative reasons to require the President to engage in more
procedures than are currently required. But, if we are attempting to
derive a form of judicial review that enforces the President’s existing
positive legal obligations, the case has yet to be made that something
more than procedural review of deliberation is required.
The bottom line is that the President’s existing positive procedural obligations do not require record-keeping and detailed technocratic justification. And, even if we normatively desire more procedural requirements on the President, it is not obvious such
requirements should be imposed by courts in the first instance rather
than, for example, Congress. If the goal is to identify a form of judicial
review that will force the President to comply with her positive obligations as they exist today, procedural review requiring deliberation
should suffice.
That said, it is important to recognize the limited ability of judicial
review to police presidential conduct. Due to a variety of justiciability,
standing, and deference doctrines, court are unlikely to robustly
242. See, e.g., Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 475 (1994) (finding that orders embodying “[p]residential discretion as to political matters [are] beyond the competence
of the courts to adjudicate” and “[w]e fully recognize[] that the consequence of our
decision [is] to foreclose judicial review”); United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310
U.S. 371, 379–80 (1940) (“[T]he judgment of the President that on the facts, adduced
in pursuance of the procedure prescribed by Congress, a change of rate is necessary is
no more subject to judicial review under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself
had exercised that judgment.”); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. 475, 499 (1866) (“An
attempt on the part of the judicial department of the government to enforce the performance of such duties [that are purely executive and political] by the President might
be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice Marshal, as ‘an absurd and excessive extravagance.’”). Indeed, as noted above, the Court expressed serious skepticism of such a form of review in Trump v. Hawaii, going out of its way to characterize
as “questionable” the proposition that the President had to explain his “finding with
sufficient detail to enable judicial review.” 138 S. Ct. at 2409.
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police presidential exercises of power.243 Focusing solely on judicial
review will thus not help ensure the President abides by her procedural duties in the vast majority of areas where she has power. To understand how we might best ensure the President complies with her
duty, we should examine how the President and Congress might enforce such compliance. The next two Sections take on that task.
B. INTERNAL EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT
Because so few exercises of presidential power are likely to be
judicially reviewed, the most impactful way to enforce the duty would
be internally within the executive branch. If the President were to
adopt mechanisms to enforce the duty, these mechanisms could govern all exercises of presidential power rather than only those resulting
in an injured party with standing to sue in a justiciable case.
Of course, the President will not implement procedural requirements on herself unless she has an incentive to do so. But presidents
procedurally constrain themselves all the time.244 And incentives to
formalize procedures to enforce the President’s duty to deliberate are
not hard to come up with. First, the President might decide that requiring such review will make the end product—the presidential directive—better. This sort of thinking helps explain why presidents
voluntarily imposed and continued to follow a formal process for how
executive orders and proclamations are issued.245 Apart from seeking
243. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power, Historical
Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1098 (2013) (“A variety of justiciability limitations . . . are regularly invoked by courts as a basis for declining to resolve issues of presidential power, especially when individual rights are not directly
implicated.”); Stack, supra note 19, at 1173–77 (explaining that current doctrine “operates to exclude judicial review of the determinations or findings the President makes
to satisfy conditions for invoking grants of statutory power”); Kagan, supra note 31, at
2369. Manheim and Watts suggest judicial review of presidential orders is likely to
increase going forward, see, e.g., Manheim & Watts, supra note 19, at 1748, which may
well be correct, but it is still likely to exclude most areas where the President has
power. For an account of why courts are unlikely to reign in executive power in a robust way due to judicial capacity constraints, see Andrew Coan & Nicholas Bullard, Judicial Capacity and Executive Power, 102 VA. L. REV. 765 (2016).
244. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 889; Gillian E. Metzger, The Interdependent
Relationship Between Internal and External Separation of Powers, 59 EMORY L.J. 423,
433 (2009) (“Presidents frequently support imposition of internal mechanisms that
substantially constrain the Executive Branch and even sometimes adopt such
measures voluntarily . . . .”); Jon D. Michaels, The (Willingly) Fettered Executive: Presidential Spinoffs in National Security Domains and Beyond, 97 VA. L. REV. 801, 801–02
(2011).
245. See, e.g., Andrew Rudalevige, Executive Orders and Presidential Unilateralism,
42 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 138, 148–56 (2012) (describing history of such procedural
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to create a more thought-through product, future presidents might
have other incentives to make the existing procedural requirements
more robust. If there was a high-profile scandal resulting from a lack
of deliberation, there would be political incentives to show that such
a mistake would not be repeated. And, more broadly, a new President
might seek to show his or her difference from past presidents by emphasizing their commitment to procedural formality. Such a political
dynamic might well follow a President like President Trump, who is
well known for making powerful decisions on the fly. So although a
President may not be likely to implement reforms to ensure she
abides by her procedural duties for completely altruistic reasons, it is
not hard to envision the political incentives to do so. And the more
scholars and others discuss the President’s existing procedural obligations and how they might be enforced, the more likely it is a President would be inclined to adopt such reforms. Indeed, the more such
reforms are seen as necessary to comply with legal obligations, the
more likely they are to be complied with given the pervasiveness of
legal review within the executive branch.246
What might these reforms look like? There are two relatively
straightforward ways the President could improve compliance with
the duty to deliberate. First, she might amend the order governing
promulgation of executive orders and proclamations to require interagency review before they are issued. This would not be very onerous,
given that presidents in modern times have adopted a general practice
of interagency review before exercising power through formal directive.247 But, while this interagency review practice is common, it is
not formally required by presidential directive.248

regulation starting with Franklin Delano Roosevelt); id. at 149 (“[T]he process was put
in place to prevent the president from being forced into what Dick Cheney once termed
‘oh, by the way . . .’ decisions, made on the fly in informal bilateral encounters with
administration officials.”).
246. See, e.g., Bradley & Morrison, supra note 243, at 1132–34 (observing that
“[t]he executive branch contains thousands of lawyers” who typically internalize legal
norms as a constraint); Gillian E. Metzger, 1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under
Siege, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1, 80–81 (2017) (“Few agency policies and sanctioned actions
go unvetted by lawyers, and agency lawyers often wield substantial power . . . over
agency policy.”).
247. See Renan, supra note 19, at 2221–30 (describing a “deliberative presidency”
norm that serves to “render the exercise of presidential judgment nonarbitrary”);
Grove, supra note 121, at 900–08 (describing interagency consultation process);
Roisman, supra note 18, at 875–76 (describing formal executive order interagency approval process).
248. See Roisman, supra note 18, at 876.
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The formal executive order governing the issuing of orders and
proclamations requires proposed directives to be submitted to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), accompanied
by a letter from the head or other authorizing official at the originating
agency “explaining the nature, purpose, background, and effect of the
proposed Executive order or proclamation.”249 If the Director of OMB
approves the proposed directive, it is then transmitted to the Attorney
General for “his consideration as to both form and legality,” a review
function now delegated to OLC.250 If the order is approved for “form
and legality,” it is then transmitted to the Director of the Office of the
Federal Register, who, upon approving certain formatting requirements, transmits it to the President for signature.251 Nothing in the order requires interagency review.252
So, while a basic practice has developed whereby, before exercising power, the President consults relevant agency and White House
officials with subject-area expertise and responsibility, this practice is
not formally required and, perhaps unsurprisingly, such interagency
review is not always conducted.253
This leaves a fairly straightforward solution. The President could
help ensure compliance with the duty to deliberate by formally requiring interagency review before promulgating formal directives.254 Of
course, the President would have to be wary of making this review
process overly burdensome.255 For example, true emergency situations could be exempted from such interagency review,256 or a
249. Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, § 2(a) (June 21, 1962).
250. Id. § 2(b); 28 C.F.R. § 0.25(b) (2018) (assigning “form and legality” review to
the Office of Legal Counsel).
251. Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847, § 2(c)–(d).
252. See generally Exec. Order No. 11,030, 27 Fed. Reg. 5847.
253. See KENNETH R. MAYER, WITH THE STROKE OF A PEN: EXECUTIVE ORDERS AND PRESIDENTIAL POWER 61 (2001) (suggesting the solicitation of interagency review might be
limited to “particularly complex or far-reaching orders”); Rudalevige, supra note 245,
at 150 (noting that “White House-driven orders” were only “usually” subject to such
clearance); Eggleston & Elbogen, supra note 172, at 829–30 (discussing how the first
version of the Travel Ban skipped interagency review); Steilen, supra note 32, at 500
(same).
254. I have previously suggested that factfinding underlying such orders be subject
to interagency review and formal sign-off. See Roisman, supra note 18, at 886. This
proposal could be expanded to all findings, including those of policy judgment.
255. Cf., e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Optimal Abuse of Power, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 673, 675
(2015) (discussing balancing costs of process against benefits of governance).
256. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 888–89; cf. Bruff, supra note 230, at 58
(“[A]ny legal prerequisites to presidential decision must allow for response to emergencies.”).
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“significance threshold” could be imposed, whereby only “significant”
directives would be subject to formal interagency review, while less
robust forms of deliberation would be sufficient for less significant directives.257 Requiring interagency review before every formal presidential directive might require more deliberation than is necessary to
comply with the minimum duty of gathering relevant information and
making a considered judgment upon it. But so long as increased deliberation is not overly costly it seems like a straightforward and commendable way to enforce the duty. It also seems practically feasible
given that the President already often engages in this practice.
Another way the President could help ensure she abides by the
duty to deliberate would be to issue an executive order clarifying that
exercises of power not subject to deliberation are not valid orders and
therefore should be ignored. Doing so might seem redundant, but it
would be a belt-and-suspenders way of seeking to ensure compliance
and would also help capture instances of exercises of power not done
by formal directive but that still require deliberation.
Although this solution might seem unnecessary, recent events
during the Trump administration suggest otherwise. There have been
numerous examples of President Trump seeking to exercise power
off-the-cuff, arbitrarily, without any deliberative process. At times,
such orders have been ignored by the President’s subordinates.258 For
257. Cf. Roisman, supra note 18, at 888 n.281 (“Constructing the appropriate ‘significance’ threshold would no doubt be complex, but such thresholds have been constructed before. For example, only regulations that meet a defined ‘significance’
threshold must go through centralized OMB review, a determination made routinely
within the executive branch.”); see Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735, § 3(f)
(Sept. 30, 1993) (defining “significant regulatory action” as an action that, inter alia,
would “[h]ave an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more”).
258. See, e.g., Rob Gillies, Secretary of Navy Says Trump’s Tweet Is Not a Formal Order, ABC NEWS (Nov. 24, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/International/
wireStory/secretary-navy-trumps-tweet-formal-order-67257130 [https://perma.cc/
SCR8-J467] (“The secretary of the U.S. Navy said he doesn’t consider a tweet by President Donald Trump an order and would need a formal order to stop a review of a sailor
who could lose his status as a Navy SEAL.”); Julian Borger, Trump Called for Seoul Evacuation at Height of North Korea Tensions, New Book Says, GUARDIAN (Dec. 9, 2019, 9:25
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2019/dec/09/trump-seoul-evacuation
-north-korea-book [https://perma.cc/C3VY-SXFZ] (detailing an off-the-cuff order by
the President to evacuate Seoul which was ignored by the military); id. (“It was one of
a number of occasions that the defense secretary at the time, James Mattis, ignored
direction from the White House. He also refused to send defense department officials
to a planned Korea war game at Camp David in the autumn of 2017, or to provide military options for intercepting North Korean ships suspected of sanctions busting.”);
Josh Gerstein, ‘This One’s a Lemon’ Vs. ‘Is He Above the Law?’: Judges Spar over Trump
Emoluments Case, POLITICO (Dec. 12, 2019, 7:38 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/
2019/12/12/judges-spar-trump-emoluments-case-083807 [https://perma.cc/3HE9
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example, the President’s tweet that “the United States Government
will not accept or allow . . . Transgender individuals to serve in . . . the
U.S. Military” was ignored by military officials until a more formal directive was issued by the Secretary of Defense.259 Similarly, President
Trump’s order to fire the Ambassador to Ukraine was not followed
through on for over a year.260 And former Secretary of Defense James
Mattis reportedly repeatedly “simply ignored the President’s directives, considering them insufficiently thought through.”261
Why was it that people required to obey the President’s commands did not follow them in these instances? It is not clear precisely
what explains these instances, but one theory that might justify them
is to take the duty to deliberate seriously. Because the President failed
to abide by his procedural obligations, he had not, in fact, lawfully exercised authority. Thus, his subordinates were justified in refusing to
comply with them. Going forward, a future President could formalize
a requirement that presidential directives not subject to due deliberation are not lawful, binding orders.262 This could be done through an
executive order or presidential memorandum and could thus make
formal this sporadic practice of disobedience of arbitrary orders.
Of course, even adopting these proposed reforms would not fully
ensure the President abides by her duty to deliberate in all instances.
Even if the President is required to engage in interagency review and
-G484] (detailing high-level Department of Justice attorney stating that President
Trump’s statement that the emoluments clause was “phony” should be discounted because “[i]t was either a tweet or an off-the-cuff statement”). Indeed, President Trump
is not the first President to have his impulsive orders ignored. President Nixon also
was ignored when he ordered his Chief of Staff to ask the White House personnel chief
to “see what we can do about” Jews serving in the federal government. See President
Nixon on Jews in the Government, U. VA. MILLER CTR., https://millercenter.org/the
-presidency/educational-resources/president-nixon-and-bob-haldeman-on-fred
-malek [https://perma.cc/42ES-3X9J].
259. See, e.g., Daphna Renan, The President’s Two Bodies, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1119,
1196–97 (2020).
260. Katherine Faulders, John Santucci, Allison Pecorin & Olivia Rubin, ‘Take Her
Out’: Recording Appears to Capture Trump at Private Dinner Saying He Wants Ukraine
Ambassador Fired, ABC NEWS (Jan. 24, 2020, 9:04 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/
Politics/recording-appears-capture-trump-private-dinner-ukraine-ambassador/
story?id=68506437 [https://perma.cc/LU9P-7ERP] (showing that President Trump
told his deputy chief of staff to fire the Ambassador to Ukraine, but she was not fired
for another year).
261. Filkins, supra note 29.
262. Of course, the order would have to be worded carefully, as the president likely
would not want to give subordinate officials too much power to interpret what “due
deliberation” might mean. How precisely to navigate this issue could be complex, but
this complexity does not seem insurmountable.
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deliberation, that does not mean she cannot reach a foreordained conclusion, and a future President could always rescind such orders. But
these requirements would likely be impactful. As noted above, requiring directives to go through a deliberative process often concretely affects the final product, even when the ultimate outcome is foreordained.263 And, presumably, in some instances, the deliberative
process will result in a different ultimate outcome as well. And although a future President could rescind such orders, doing so would
be costly—it would essentially be an acknowledgment that the President wished to exercise power arbitrarily, without proper deliberation. Thus, there is good reason to think that, once promulgated, such
orders could be quite sticky, as the existing orders formalizing the
process for executive orders and proclamations have been.264
To be sure, this proposal cannot ensure universal compliance
with the President’s duty to deliberate, because there is no such thing
as universal compliance with the law.265 All one can endeavor to do is
help improve compliance, and this approach would likely do that.
C. CONGRESSIONAL ENFORCEMENT
Congress could also do more to enforce the President’s duty to
deliberate. One way to do so would be to pass a framework statute
requiring interagency deliberation before the President can exercise
delegated power. Such a statute would clarify that when Congress requires the President to make a particular determination in order to
exercise power—such as finding that certain conduct is in the “national security” interest or the “paramount interest of the United
States,”—barring some emergency or other good cause, the President
can only make that determination after gathering relevant information and consulting subject-matter experts within the executive
branch.
Some might argue such a statute would be facially unconstitutional,266 but there is little reason to think it would be.267 Although the
263. See supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
264. See Rudalevige, supra note 245, at 148–51.
265. For example, although criminal law enforcement obviously constrains conduct to some extent, it does not eliminate all crime.
266. Cf. Common Legis. Encroachments on Exec. Branch Auth., 13 Op. O.L.C. 248,
253–54 (1989) (suggesting some statutory consultation requirements constitute unconstitutional “micromanagement” of executive branch).
267. Such power, in fact, might be thought to flow rather naturally from the Necessary and Proper Clause. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . [t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing powers, and all other powers vested by this Constitution in the Government
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Supreme Court has expressed some misgivings about Congress procedurally regulating the President’s exercise of power,268 it has never
stated such procedural regulation is impermissible.269 And, in fact,
Congress routinely regulates how the President exercises statutory
power procedurally.270 I am not aware of anyone suggesting that the
Antiquities Act of 1906’s requirement that the President create national monuments via “proclamation” is a constitutional violation.271
Yet, of course, dictating the format by which the President can exercise
her power to create a monument is a procedural obligation. Moreover,
the Court has frequently relied on Congress’s procedural regulations
as supporting its analysis of why particular delegations to the President did not violate the nondelegation doctrine,272 or why it could not
of the United States . . . .”); see Steilen, supra note 32, at 502 (suggesting Necessary and
Proper Clause grants such power); Todd David Peterson, Procedural Checks: How the
Constitution (and Congress) Control the Power of the Three Branches, 13 DUKE J. CONST.
L. & PUB. POL’Y 209, 251 (2017) (“The Necessary and Proper Clause gives Congress the
express constitutional authority to establish procedural checks on the manner in
which the executive branch carries out authority delegated to it by Congress.”).
268. See Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 800–01 (1992) (“Out of respect
for the separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President,
we find that textual silence [regarding the President in the APA] is not enough to subject the President to the provisions of the APA. We would require an express statement
by Congress before assuming it intended the President’s performance of his statutory
duties to be reviewed for abuse of discretion.”).
269. Cf. Steilen, supra note 32, at 502 (“The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed
that Congress may subject the President and principal executive officers to procedural
requirements imposed by law.”). For an analogous and compelling account of why Congress has the power to procedurally regulate the President, see id. at 502–08.
270. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 892–93 (collecting examples of existing
congressional procedural regulations of presidential factfinding).
271. 54 U.S.C. § 320301(a) (“The President may . . . declare by public proclamation
historic landmarks . . . that are situated on land owned or controlled by the Federal
Government to be national monuments.”).
272. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 405 (1928)
(“[B]efore the President reaches a conclusion on the subject of investigation [delegated
to him], the Tariff Commission must make an investigation, and in doing so must give
notice to all parties interested and an opportunity to adduce evidence and to be
heard.”); Gundy v. United States, 139 S. Ct. 2116, 2139 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that the statute at issue in J.W. Hampton was constitutional in part because
the statute “offered guidance on how to determine costs of production listing several
relevant factors and establishing a process for interested parties to submit evidence”
(emphasis added)); Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 559
(1976) (“Section 232(b) easily fulfills [the ‘intelligible principle’] test. It establishes
clear preconditions to Presidential action . . . .”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S.
417, 484–85 (1998) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that one way in which the Line Item
Veto Act creates an “intelligible principle” is “procedural. The Act tells the president
that, in ‘identifying dollar amounts [or] . . . items . . . for cancellation’ . . . he is to ‘consider . . . any specific sources of information referenced in [relevant] law or . . . the best
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review presidential exercises of power.273 And many scholars have explained the Court’s invalidation of delegations in Panama Refining and
Schechter Poultry as motivated, at least in part, by the fact that Congress had failed to regulate the President’s power procedurally.274 The
Court’s decision in these lines of cases would not make sense if Congress were categorically barred from procedurally regulating the
President. Thus, there is no categorical bar on Congress regulating the
President’s exercise of statutory power procedurally and requiring internal deliberation in particular would not be novel either. The Court
has previously upheld delegations to the President where the President could only exercise power following the actions of other executive branch actors.275
It is worth noting that even the Trump administration—which
was very protective of presidential power—did not seem to view such
a requirement as presumptively invalid. For example, OLC concluded
that the President could withhold certain reports by the Secretary of
available information . . . .’”); Pan. Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 432 (1935) (“‘In creating such an administrative agency the legislature, to prevent its being a pure delegation of legislative power, must enjoin upon it a certain course of procedure and certain
rules of decision in the performance of its function. It is a wholesome and necessary
principle that such an agency must pursue the procedure and rules enjoined and show
a substantial compliance therewith to give validity to its action . . . .’ We cannot regard
the President as immune from the application of these constitutional principles.” (emphasis added) (citing and discussing Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 260
U.S. 48, 59 (1922))).
273. See, e.g., United States v. George S. Bush & Co., 310 U.S. 371, 379–80 (1940)
(“[T]he judgment of the President that on the facts, adduced in pursuance of the procedure prescribed by Congress, a change of rate is necessary is no more subject to judicial
review under this statutory scheme than if Congress itself had exercised that judgment.” (emphasis added)).
274. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 31, at 2365 (“The awesome substantive breadth of
this delegation [in Schechter Poultry], combined with its lack of procedural constraints . . . made it ripe for invalidation . . . .” (emphasis added)); Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Administrative State,
N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 525 (2003) (“[T]he Court regarded the President as part of the problem in Schechter Poultry and Panama Refining . . . . No agency or administrative process
stood between the President and private groups, as some sort of mediating influence.”
(emphasis added)); see also Steilen, supra note 32, at 512 (“One can see evidence of
[the] influence [of procedure] in Schechter Poultry v. United States, where the Court
complained not only of the broad scope of rule-making authority conferred on the
President, but of the absence of any ‘administrative procedure’ for exercising that authority.”).
275. See, e.g., J.W. Hampton, 276 U.S. at 402 (upholding delegation where “[i]investigations to assist the President in ascertaining differences in costs of production under this section shall be made by the United States Tariff Commission, and no proclamation shall be issued under this section until such investigation shall have been
made”).
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Commerce to the President relating to whether automobile imports
threaten national security pursuant to the “deliberative process” privilege.276 In doing so, however, OLC did not bother to question the statutory scheme, which makes the President’s power to impose tariffs
contingent on the Secretary of Commerce conducting an investigation
and giving the President a report.277 Such a statutory scheme—which
is again not novel—is the equivalent of an internal deliberation or consultation requirement.
There is thus nothing presumptively unconstitutional about Congress requiring the President to deliberate before exercising statutory
power. That said, procedural requirements might be unconstitutional
in certain instances. This would depend on standard separation of
powers balancing, which requires determining whether Congress’s
procedural requirements “prevent[] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitutionally assigned functions” and, if so,
whether “that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the constitutional authority of Congress.”278 It is possible such procedural requirements might be unconstitutional in some
circumstances,279 but a framework statute requiring deliberation
would appear to be constitutional as a general matter.
276. Publ’n of a Rep. to the President on the Effect of Auto. and Auto.-Part Imps. on
the Nat’l Sec., 44 Op. O.L.C. __ (Jan. 17, 2020) (slip op. at 10–11) https://www
.justice.gov/olc/opinion/publication-report-president-effect-automobile-and
-automobile-part-imports-national [https://perma.cc/B7JF-R7C2] (“The [Secretary of
Commerce’s] report, almost by definition, comprises . . . deliberative material . . . .”).
277. See id. at 2 (“Before the President may take such an action [to adjust imports],
however, the Secretary of Commerce must conduct, on request or his own motion, an
‘appropriate investigation to determine the effects on the national security of imports
of the article.’ . . . If the Secretary finds that the relevant imports ‘threaten to impair the
national security,’ then the President has 90 days to decide whether he agrees with
that finding.”). To be clear, the constitutionality of this scheme was not addressed by
OLC explicitly, but the fact it did not think the scheme even merited questioning is illustrative.
278. Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977); see also Const. Separation of Powers Between the President & Cong., 20 Op. O.L.C. 124, 133 (1996) (discussing such balancing under the “General Separation of Powers Principle”).
279. For an example of analogous analysis, the Department of Defense claimed that
a requirement to notify Congress before transferring detainees from Guantanamo was
unconstitutional when applied to the swap of such detainees for American prisoner of
war Bowe Bergdahl. See, e.g., Jack Goldsmith, Was the Bergdahl Swap Lawful?, LAWFARE
(Mar. 25, 2015, 9:19 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/was-bergdahl-swap-lawful
[https://perma.cc/L6Z2-FAEG] (“DOD’s constitutional analysis [stated]: . . . [E]ven
though, as a general matter, Congress had authority under its constitutional powers
related to war and the military [for a 30 days’ notice of transfer] . . . that provision
would have been unconstitutional to the extent it applied to the unique circumstances
of this transfer.”).
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If Congress attempted to regulate the President’s constitutional
authorities, it would raise thornier issues.280 That said, it is not clear
why even where the President’s constitutional authorities are at issue,
anything more than separation of powers balancing is required. After
all, the separation of powers balancing test set forth in Nixon applied
to a constitutional authority.281 Thus, it might be easier to show the
requisite burden for constitutional authorities, but that burden would
still have to be met.282
In short, Congress too could seek to enforce the President’s duty
to deliberate, and, in fact, is likely better positioned to do so than
courts, given its democratic legitimacy and ability to consider the benefits and costs of such regulation. That said, whether it would have the
political will to do so is another question entirely.283
IV. THE NORMATIVE SUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESIDENT’S DUTY TO
DELIBERATE
Even if one accepts that the President has a duty to deliberate and
that the best way to enforce it is to have the courts, the President, or
Congress require the President to engage in some form of interagency
consultation and consideration before exercising power, a stark normative question remains: Are such deliberative procedures normatively sufficient? We clearly do not think that agencies can exercise
significant power legitimately simply by first engaging in internal

280. See, e.g., Todd David Peterson, Congressional Power over Pardon & Amnesty:
Legislative Authority in the Shadow of Presidential Prerogative, 38 WAKE FOREST L. REV.
1225, 1252 (2003) (“It is unlikely . . . that the Supreme Court would permit Congress
to impose even these procedural restrictions directly on the President himself.”).
281. See Nixon, 433 U.S. at 441 (“We reject at the outset appellant’s argument that
the Act’s regulation of the disposition of Presidential materials within the Executive
Branch constitutes, without more, a violation of the principle of separation of powers.”); id. at 444–45 (“[W]hatever are the future possibilities for constitutional conflict
in the promulgation of regulations respecting public access to particular documents,
nothing contained in the Act renders it unduly disruptive of the Executive Branch and,
therefore, unconstitutional on its face.”).
282. See, e.g., January 9, 2006 Letter from Scholars and Former Government Officials
to Congressional Leadership in Response to Justice Department Letter of December 22,
2005, 81 IND. L.J. 1364, 1368 (2006) (“In [passing FISA], Congress did not deny that the
President has constitutional power to conduct electronic surveillance for national security purposes; rather, Congress properly concluded that ‘ . . . Congress has the power
to regulate the conduct of such surveillance by legislating a reasonable procedure,
which then becomes the exclusive means by which such surveillance may be conducted.’ . . . This analysis, Congress noted, was ‘supported by two successive Attorneys
General.’” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 24 (1978))).
283. That question will have to wait for another day.
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executive branch consultation. So why would it be permissible for the
President to do so?
The existing literature on the topic has not focused on this question.284 Administrative law scholarship has long struggled with how to
justify the vast power exercised by administrative agencies.285 It
started by seeking to legitimate such power by conceiving of agencies
as serving as mere “transmission belt[s]” for Congress’s desires.286
When this theory became untenable, it was replaced by a model that
legitimated agency power based on agency “expertise.”287 And, when
that failed, administrative power was justified based on a theory of
“interest representation.”288 Finally, when that model failed, administrative law scholars sought to legitimate agency power through the
President’s role in so-called “presidential administration.”289 Under
this model—the current reigning justificatory model—the President’s
role in influencing and coordinating administrative action legitimates

284. A notable exception is Kathryn Kovacs’s contemporaneous article arguing
that the APA should apply to the President’s exercise of statutory authority—both as a
matter of positive law and to further a number of normative values. See Kovacs, supra
note 5. Like the discussion below, Kovacs’s account would suggest that mere internal
deliberation is insufficient to legitimate the vast array of the President’s power. Kovacs
would thus have the Supreme Court overturn its decision in Franklin v. Massachusetts
and apply the APA to the President. The discussion below assumes that the Court does
not overturn its decision in Franklin, and asks how we might best conceptualize procedurally regulating the President outside of the APA.
285. For an excellent summary of the progression of the justificatory models, see
Miriam Seifter, States, Agencies, and Legitimacy, 67 VAND. L. REV. 443, 478–79 (2014):
In the early era of administrative law, commentators depicted agency decisionmaking as a “transmission belt” that merely carried congressional intent
into action . . . . When open-ended New Deal delegations to agencies made the
transmission belt concept implausible, a second approach cast administration as a science. Under this expertise model, the discipline inherent in the
objective work of bureaucrats legitimated agencies from within. But this
model too emerged as inapt; few administrative decisions were purely technical, and administrators were susceptible to influence—particularly industry influence—as they made value judgments. That observation spurred reforms toward a third model of “interest representation,” in which legitimacy
stems from a quasi-legislative process that accounts for all interests, not just
those of powerful regulated entities. . . . Finally, in the most recent model, attention has shifted to the President and the legitimacy that stems from centralized decisionmaking responsive to a national majority.
286. Id. at 478.
287. Id.
288. See id. See generally Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REV. 1667 (1975).
289. See Seifter, supra note 285, at 479.
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administrative power largely because of the President’s democratic
accountability.290
There has now been an enormous body of work on “presidential
administration” both defending and critiquing the President’s role in
directing or influencing the conduct of agencies. But this literature
considers the President’s role on top of the procedural requirements
applicable to agencies.291 This literature has not focused on whether
the President’s accountability without the procedures required of administrative agencies can legitimate presidential exercises of power.
And there is reason to be skeptical that it can. No account of presidential administration seeks to defend the President’s role as sufficient to
legitimize executive power in lieu of such procedural requirements.
Indeed, even presidential administration’s most prominent defender,
then-Professor Elena Kagan, seemed uncomfortable with direct delegations to the President rather than delegations to agency officials.292
In short, many critics of presidential administration would undoubtedly be unsatisfied with the President’s ability to exercise power
solely by consulting experts within the executive branch,293 but it is
not clear that even defenders of presidential administration would defend such conduct.294
290. See id. (“Most scholars now agree that the presidential control model is dominant, such that the legitimacy of administrative action turns on agency adherence to
the President’s direction and, by extension, to the preferences of the national majority.”); Kagan, supra note 31, at 2331–46 (arguing for presidential model on accountability and effectiveness grounds); Bressman, supra note 274, at 490 (“[The model] attempts to legitimate administrative policy decisions, through presidential politics, on
the ground that they are responsive to public preferences.”).
291. See, e.g., supra note 31 and accompanying text (collecting prominent sources
in this debate).
292. See Kagan, supra note 31, at 2369 (“[G]iven the difficulty of controlling the
exercise of discretion delegated to the President—rule of law values may counsel extra
hesitation in allowing the delegation in the first instance.”); cf. Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 489–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (suggesting lack of administrative
standards and judicial review as reasons to doubt delegations to the President); Todd
D. Rakoff, The Shape of the Law in the American Administrative State, 11 TEL AVIV U.
STUD. L. 9, 22–23 (1992) (discussing the problematic nature of the President being
both “omnipowered and omnicompetent”).
293. See, e.g., Bressman, supra note 274 (explaining how a President’s accountability in presidential administration is insufficient to address constitutional concerns
about arbitrary governance); Kathryn E. Kovacs, Rules About Rulemaking and the Rise
of the Unitary Executive, 70 ADMIN. L. REV. 515, 566 (2018) (stating that “direct presidential control of agency decisionmaking” resembles autocracy, and “[u]nless the President is obligated to consider a multiplicity of public views in an open decisionmaking
process, he should not be engaged in the quasi-legislative function of rulemaking”).
294. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 31, at 2369; see also Watts, supra note 31, at 744
(noting the “need to ensure that presidential control does not undermine the notice-
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Put simply, if we take seriously the concerns with executive
branch governance that are well trod in the administrative law domain,295 it seems hard to accept the view that the vast array of power
delegated directly to the President, surveyed in Part I, can be legitimately exercised simply by consulting officials within the executive
branch. Although the President may not always need to go through
more procedures before legitimately exercising power, it seems
doubtful that the President can legitimately exercise all the powers
delegated to her—over the environment, domestic prices, immigration, government regulation, and so on—solely by engaging in internal
deliberation and reasoned consideration.296
But, even if more procedural requirements are warranted, this
does not necessarily mean we should simply apply administrative law
to the President. There is good reason to think presidential law ought
to differ in important respects from administrative law.297 First, the
President is positioned meaningfully differently than agencies in important ways. The core competency of agencies has long been their
expertise.298 What concerned people was primarily their lack of accountability.299 The President is situated in the opposite direction.
and-comment process or the public’s right to participate in that process in a meaningful way”).
295. To be sure, there are important arguments that we should not take such concerns as seriously as we have. See generally Nicholas Bagley, The Procedure Fetish, 118
MICH. L. REV. 345 (2019).
296. Scholars sympathetic to Lisa Bressman’s terrific account of arbitrariness concerns that remain notwithstanding the President’s role in administration, might be
particularly concerned. See generally Bressman, supra note 274.
297. As noted above, supra note 284, Kathryn Kovacs has argued that we ought to
apply the APA’s procedural requirements to the President both as a matter of the
proper interpretation of the APA and for a number of normative reasons relating to
public participation, political accountability, transparency, deliberation, and uniformity. See generally Kovacs, supra note 5, at 97–106. However, if the Supreme Court
does not overturn Franklin v. Massachusetts and apply the APA to the President, then
conceptualizing the optimal procedure for the President allows us to start from
scratch. This can provide an exciting opportunity to apply lessons we have learned
from the history of the development of the administrative law of agencies to design a
body of procedural law tailored specifically to the President. See infra notes 303–06
and accompanying text.
298. See PETER M. SHANE, MADISON’S NIGHTMARE: HOW EXECUTIVE POWER THREATENS
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 164 (2009) (“Expertise provides a foundational rationale for the
entire phenomenon of specialized agencies under different administrators.”); Kovacs,
supra note 293, at 565 (noting “expertise” as a “purpose for and benefit[] of administrative agencies”); Kagan, supra note 31, at 2261 (noting how expertise served as a
dominant justification for agency power).
299. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 372 (“Agencies are . . . said to labor under an
acute democratic deficit . . . .”); Manheim & Watts, supra note 19, at 1798 (“[A]
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What she has is relative formal accountability,300 and what she lacks
is expertise.301 In some ways, the President’s accountability combined
with her duty to deliberate might address some of the President’s core
weaknesses here. If the President deliberates by consulting with the
relevant subject-matter experts in the executive branch, the President
can act in a way informed both by agency expertise and her direct accountability. The duty to deliberate could thus help address some of
the concerns we might have about presidential exercises of power.302
But, consulting internal experts in combination with the President’s accountability is still unlikely to be sufficient to legitimate all
the President’s exercises of power. First, there are many reasons to
doubt the robustness of the President’s direct accountability.303 Meanwhile, “expertise” has long been deemed insufficient to justify agency
power.304 Moreover, if combining the President’s accountability with
agency expertise in this way were sufficient to legitimate the President’s exercise of power, then the upshot of the presidential administration literature would be that when the President and an agency
motivating force behind the judiciary’s creation of many administrative law principles
has been political accountability.”); Stewart, supra note 288, at 1675 (discussing how
administrative law “legitimates intrusions into private liberties by agency officials not
subject to electoral control”); cf. Bressman, supra note 274, at 472 (noting critiques of
expertise model not rooted solely in lack of accountability).
300. See, e.g., Kagan, supra note 31, at 2334–37 (discussing the President’s comparative advantage with respect to accountability). Of course, there are many reasons
to doubt how meaningful this accountability is. See infra note 303 and accompanying
text.
301. See Kovacs, supra note 293, at 565 (“[T]he President lacks the expertise of
agencies.”); SHANE, supra note 298 (“The ideal of expertise argues strongly for diffusing
policy making authority to specialized agencies with the capacity and incentive to master their own policy domains.”); Kagan, supra note 31, at 2352; Jody Freeman & Adrian
Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From Politics to Expertise, 2007 SUP. CT. REV. 51.
302. See Steilen, supra note 32, at 507 (“Responsiveness to ‘the reason of the public’ is achieved by a participatory and reflective presidential policy-making process,
not by a slapdash one. On these assumptions, a statutory regime incorporating interagency procedures would enhance, rather than degrade, the popular legitimacy of
presidential policies.”).
303. See, e.g., Roisman, supra note 18, at 880–81; Nina Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1160–61 (2010)
(describing the difficulty of holding a President accountable given low-information
voting, infrequency of elections, and breadth of issues); Jerry L. Mashaw & David Berke,
Presidential Administration in a Regime of Separated Powers: An Analysis of Recent
American Experience, 35 YALE J. ON REGUL. 549, 612 (2018) (suggesting the President is
not necessarily more accountable than agencies); Kovacs, supra note 293, at 100 (suggesting agencies are more accountable than the President).
304. See, e.g., Stewart, supra note 288, at 1711 (noting the “breakdown” of the expertise model); Kagan, supra note 31, at 2261–64 (describing expertise model as “almost quaint”).
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agree on an exercise of power, then the agency need not go through
the typical procedural requirements of the APA. But no one has
seemed to suggest that. In short, while the President can plausibly
claim to combine some level of accountability and, upon proper deliberation, some level of expertise, it is unlikely this combination can justify the relatively minimal procedural requirements of deliberation in
all the areas the President can exercise power. But it may well justify
different procedures in some instances than those applicable to agencies.305
Apart from the strengths and weaknesses of the President in relation to agencies, there are other reasons not to automatically apply
administrative law to the President. Simply put, the body of administrative law that exists today is historically contingent. It originated in
the particular concerns that led to the enactment of the APA in 1946
and has been broadened and refined through judicial doctrine reviewing agency action since then.306 It is inextricably tied to perceptions of
the breadth of power of the administrative state and its relationship
to “the status of the individual in society.”307 It would be surprising if
the form of regulation that has emerged to deal with agency power
between 1946 and today has been optimal,308 let alone that it can be
simply applied to a different actor. Perhaps no administrative law
scholar thinks administrative law has struck the balance exactly
right,309 and surely we have learned some lessons in how to procedurally regulate executive power over the course of the last eighty years.

305. For example, administrative law’s full complement of notice and comment requirements might be less necessary for the President than for agencies because of the
President’s accountability and use of internal expertise. But this is a complex question
worthy of future exploration. See infra notes 311–14 and accompanying text.
306. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 293, at 532–45 (noting how judicially created law
since the APA differs from the requirements of the APA’s text); Jack M. Beermann &
Gary Lawson, Reprocessing Vermont Yankee, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 856, 857 (2007).
307. Bressman, supra note 274, at 478 (citing Stewart, supra note 288, at 1812).
This is not the same problem for the President, who has expansive power but simply
does not regulate the bulk of public life—or affect private due process interests—on
anything like the scale of the administrative state.
308. See, e.g., Kovacs, supra note 293, at 545–55 (suggesting that judicially created
procedural requirements that expand the text of the APA have had unintended negative consequences); see also Bagley, supra note 295, at 400–01 (“[M]inimalism should
be the watchword. New procedures should be greeted with suspicion; old procedures
should be revisited, with an eye to cutting them back or eliminating them altogether.
Administrative law could achieve more by doing less.”).
309. Routine among concerns are those relating to potential “ossification” of rulemaking, pushing regulatory policy underground to avoid such burdens, disincentivizing legislative fixes, and incentivizing enhanced presidential power. See Kovacs, supra
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Examining the field of presidential law thus provides us with a
new and exciting opportunity to take the lessons from administrative
law and apply them to a new actor, without being burdened by the
contingent and ad hoc nature by which administrative law has been
created. Surely some features of the current administrative law landscape might be salutary, but others may not be.310
But to understand when we ought to add procedural requirements to the President and what such requirements might look like,311
it would be helpful to have a fuller picture of the world of presidential
delegations. In particular, we need a better sense of precisely when
the President is delegated power. Part I of this Article provides a survey of this, but a more comprehensive account can help us understand
both the substantive range of authorities given to the President, as
well as how Congress currently explicitly procedurally regulates such
presidential delegations.312 It would also help to have a robust theory
of why Congress delegates to the President, rather than agencies, at all.
Such a theory is largely absent in the existing literature but would be
useful to understand when we might want more or less procedure,
and what such procedure might look like.313 For example, one form of
procedure might be desirable if we envision such delegations as premised on the President’s accountability.314 Another form may be more
appropriate if such delegations are premised on a desire to take advantage of the President’s cross-executive branch perspective and

note 293, at 545–66; Bagley, supra note 295, at 401 (calling for review of procedural
requirements “with an eye to cutting them back or eliminating them altogether”).
310. See Bagley, supra note 295, at 400 (“Instead of defending proceduralism at a
high level of abstraction, lawyers should develop a more granular perspective on the
effects that particular procedures have on the task of governance.”).
311. Some avenues to explore would be modified notice and comment procedures
in certain substantive areas and requiring the President to promulgate more self-binding “administrative standards.” Cf. Bressman, supra note 274, at 530 (calling for resurrection of administrative standards approach in administrative law).
312. For some illustrative examples of how Congress currently procedurally regulates some presidential delegations, see Roisman, supra note 18, at 892–93.
313. In a work in progress entitled Delegating to the President, I plan to provide
such a theory.
314. See Peter L. Strauss & Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in
Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 190 (1986) (“[T]he President is electorally
accountable [and] is the only official in government with a national constituency. These
characteristics make him uniquely well-situated to design regulatory policy in a way
that is responsive to the interests of the public as a whole.”); see also Kagan, supra note
31, at 2331–46 (discussing the President’s advantages in accountability and regulatory
effectiveness).
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responsibility.315 And another form might be justified if delegations
are premised on necessity during an emergency or some other temporary problem.316 And so on.
Apart from matching procedural requirements to the reasons for
delegations, we might wish the procedures to vary by substantive
area. Unlike administrative law, the procedural requirements on the
President need not be trans-substantive. Perhaps we would want one
form of procedure for environmental delegations, one for national
monuments, another for price stabilization delegations, and another
for foreign sanctions or military organization. We might want more
procedures in some areas—say relating to freezing prices in the economy, setting environmental standards, or regulating government procurement contracts—but be comfortable with fewer procedures in
other areas—perhaps in dealing with true disasters or public health
pandemics.
Surely more can be done to improve how the President exercises
power delegated directly to her. But to make progress in that endeavor, it would help to know more about when the President is delegated such power, why such delegations exist, and how Congress currently procedurally regulates such delegations. We should take our
time to better understand the phenomenon we seek to regulate as well
as to identify the lessons we might learn from the last hundred years
of procedural regulation of the burgeoning administrative state. This
Section hopes to set the stage for this important project.

315. See Kate Andrias, The President’s Enforcement Power, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1031,
1084 (2013) (“From [the President’s] vantage point, he can focus on issues that fall
within the jurisdiction of a variety of executive and independent agencies, each dealing
with only part of the problem.”); COMM’N ON L. & THE ECON., A.B.A., FEDERAL REGULATION:
ROADS TO REFORM 163 (1979) (statement of Hon. Henry J. Friendly) (“Each agency has
a natural devotion to its primary purpose . . . . Someone in Government, and in the short
run that someone can only be the President, must have power to make the agencies
work together . . . .”).
316. The distinction between regularized oversight and one-off regulations was
one of the grounds upon which the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative
Procedure suggested that delegations to the President, rather than agencies, might be
desirable. ATT’Y GEN.’s COMM. ON ADMIN. PROC., FINAL REPORT OF ATTORNEY GENERAL’S
COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE 100–01 (1941) (“Instead of being simply one
means of continuous, integrated regulation, such as most of the regulatory bureaus and
commissions undertake, [powers conferred on the President] involve isolated or temporary authority to deal with emergency situations and often the determination of
high matters of State.”).
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CONCLUSION
The President wields enormous power. She regulates, she adjudicates, and she does much, much more. Yet, unlike when agencies exercise such power, we know very little about what procedures the
President must go through before exercising power. The question is
not what administrative law requires but what a body of presidential
law requires. This Article argues that this body of law has bite. The
President must gather relevant information and make a considered
judgment based on it before exercising power. In other words, the
President must deliberate. Identifying this duty can help clarify recent
debates about how courts ought to review presidential exercises of
power as well as illuminate how the President and Congress might
better enforce these obligations. But it also raises the question of
whether the President’s positive legal procedural obligations are normatively sufficient. Is it legitimate for the President to exercise all the
power she is delegated subject only to a requirement that she deliberate within the executive branch before doing so? The answer is likely
“yes” for some areas of power, but no for others. But wherever one
comes out on this normative question, identifying the positive duty of
deliberation is progress. The President is under real procedural obligations before exercising power. “Presidential law” exists. With this
knowledge in hand, the project of perfecting it can begin.

